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THE UNINTENTIONAL RAPIST 
I. BENNETT CAPERS

 
I am a rapist. Not by choice. But when I look in the mirror and see 
what others see, I know there’s no hiding it. I am a rapist. 
No, I have never followed a woman to her car at night, pulled a knife 
on her, and forced her to put out or be killed. Nor have I tackled an early 
morning jogger in the park, putting one hand over her mouth before she 
could scream and yanking down her running shorts with my other hand. In 
terms of crawling through windows in apartment complexes where single 
women live, that hasn’t been my thing either. I am not that kind of rapist. 
Nor have I laced the drink of a girl at a frat party, or explained to a girl 
who kept saying no and crying as I unbuttoned her blouse that she really 
meant yes. I could go on, but suffice it to say that I’m like a boy scout 
when it comes to women. Honest. 
Okay. I can tell you’re confused. You’re wondering, is this guy a rapist 
or what?  
Sometimes, I ask myself the same question.  
Maybe it’s all in his mind, you’re wondering. 
Not in my mind.  
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INTRODUCTION 
When it comes to rape, the case law is replete with troubling cases, but 
one of the most troubling is McQuirter v. State.
1
 Part of the trouble has to 
do with the outcome of the case: notwithstanding the ambiguous evidence 
and a questionable confession, the Alabama court affirmed the conviction 
of McQuirter, ―a Negro man,‖ for attempting to commit an assault with 
intent to rape.
2
 Part of the trouble also has to do with the court‘s 
endorsement of the means by which the jury was permitted to find the 
requisite intent to commit rape: ―In determining the question of intention 
the jury may consider social conditions and customs founded upon racial 
differences, such as that the prosecutrix was a white woman and defendant 
was a Negro man.‖3 But this, I think, is only part of why the case is so 
troubling. 
Since the case is not well known—it broke no new ground, and the 
legal issue it addressed was not novel—some recitation of the ―facts‖ is in 
order. According to the opinion: 
 About 8:00 o‘clock on the night of June 29, 1951, Mrs. Ted 
Allen, a white woman, with her two children and a neighbor‘s little 
girl, were drinking Coca-Cola at the ―Tiny Diner‖ in Atmore. When 
they started in the direction of Mrs. Allen‘s home she noticed 
appellant sitting in the cab of a parked truck. As she passed the 
truck appellant said something unintelligible, opened the truck door 
and placed his foot on the running board.
4
 
 
 
 1. 63 So. 2d 388 (Ala. Ct. App. 1953). 
 2. Id. at 388. 
 3. Id. at 390. 
 4. Id. at 389. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss6/3
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This much did not appear to be in dispute. In terms of what happened 
next, however, or rather how to interpret what happened next, the 
prosecutrix and the defendant had very different views.  
 Mrs. Allen testified appellant followed her down the street and 
when she reached Suell Lufkin‘s house she stopped. As she turned 
into the Lufkin house appellant was within two or three feet of her. 
She waited ten minutes for appellant to pass. When she proceeded 
on her way, appellant came toward her from behind a telephone 
pole. She told the children to run to Mr. Simmons‘ house and tell 
him to come and meet her. When appellant saw Mr. Simmons he 
turned and went back down the street to the intersection and leaned 
on a stop sign just across the street from Mrs. Allen‘s home. Mrs. 
Allen watched him at the sign from Mr. Simmons‘ porch for about 
thirty minutes, after which time he came back down the street and 
appellant went on home.
5
 
For his part, the defendant, who had never before been arrested, 
presented several character witnesses.
6
 The defendant also testified in his 
own defense, denying that he followed Mrs. Allen or otherwise acted 
inappropriately. 
 Appellant, as a witness in his own behalf, testified he and Bill 
Page, another Negro, carried a load of junk-iron from Monroeville 
to Pensacola; on their way back to Monroeville they stopped in 
Atmore. They parked the truck near the ―Tiny Diner‖ and rode to 
the ―Front,‖ the colored section, in a cab. [He] came back to the 
truck around 8:00 o‘clock and sat in the truck cab for about thirty 
minutes. He decided to go back to the ―Front‖ to look for Bill Page. 
As he started up the street he saw prosecutrix and her children. He 
turned around and waited until he decided they were gone, then he 
walked up the street toward the ―Front.‖ When he reached the 
intersection at the telegraph pole he decided he didn‘t want to go to 
the ―Front‖ and sat around there a few minutes, then went on to the 
―Front‖ and stayed about 25 or 30 minutes, and came back to the 
truck.
7
 
 
 
 5. Id. 
 6. Two residents of Monroeville testified as to McQuirter‘s ―good reputation for peace and 
quiet and for truth and veracity.‖ Id. 
 7. Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Again, McQuirter v. State is a troubling case. There are the troubling 
legal and factual issues. Demarcating the line between innocent acts, mere 
preparation, and criminal attempt is notoriously difficult.
8
 And since the 
crime of assault is itself predicated on the notion of attempt—an attempted 
battery—McQuirter‘s conviction on the charge of ―attempt to commit an 
assault with intent to rape‖ seems doubly problematic.9 The court‘s 
circular clarification—the court translates the charge as ―an attempt to rape 
which has not proceeded far enough to amount to an assault‖10—only adds 
to the difficulty.  
There are also the racial issues. I have already referenced the court‘s 
conclusion that the jury was permitted to consider ―social conditions and 
customs founded upon racial differences‖ in inferring intent.11 But the 
racial issues go beyond this overt remark. There are also the racialized 
mores. For example, the court, in identifying the white witnesses, uses the 
address ―Mr.‖ or ―Mrs.‖12 No titles are allowed either McQuirter or the 
identified black witnesses.
13
 (There are gender issues as well, to be sure; 
that the prosecutrix is referred to by her husband‘s full name, a common 
practice in the 1950s, is but one example.) The opinion takes for granted, 
and in doing so adds legitimacy to, the notion of racialized spaces. That 
McQuirter had stopped in the white part of town, and that there existed the 
―‗Front,‘ the colored section,‖14 is taken as a given. That McQuirter‘s 
walking alone on the same street as Mrs. Ted Allen, ―a white woman,‖15 
was an encroachment upon her space, is also taken as a given. Even 
McQuirter, in his testimony, understood that the proper thing to do once 
he saw Mrs. Ted Allen was to ―turn[] around and wait[] until . . . they had 
gone.‖16 Space is racialized, and so is sex. By sex, I am not referring to 
 
 
 8. On this difficulty, see generally JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 423 
(2006) (discussing the difficulty in ―drawing a line between noncriminal preparation and criminal 
attempt‖). As one court observed, ―the line of demarkation [sic] is not a line at all but a murky 
‗twilight zone.‘‖ United States v. Williamson, 42 M.J. 613, 617 n.2 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 1995). 
 9. McQuirter, 63 So. 2d at 388. 
 10. Id. at 390. 
 11. Id.  
 12. Id. passim. 
 13. Id. It would be more than a decade before a black litigant would successfully contest this 
form of address before the Supreme Court. In Hamilton v. Alabama, 376 U.S. 650 (1964), the Court 
reversed a judgment of contempt against Mary Hamilton for refusing to answer questions in court. The 
reason for her refusal was simple: the lawyer kept addressing her as ―Mary,‖ despite her request to be 
addressed as ―Miss Hamilton‖ and thus accorded the same respect as the white witnesses in the 
courtroom. See Ex Parte Hamilton, 156 So. 2d 926 (Ala. 1963). 
 14. McQuirter, 63 So. 2d at 389. 
 15. Id. at 389, 390. 
 16. Id. at 389. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss6/3
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gender here. I am referring to actual sex. It is not only the possibility of 
non-consensual sex that is being policed; what is also rendered illicit is 
even the possibility of interracial consensual sex. What is at risk is not just 
sexual intercourse, but its natural precursor, social intercourse. 
All of these are troubling issues. And when I teach McQuirter, many 
students respond by attempting—there is that word again—to de-trouble 
the case. They do this in one of two ways, either through hypothesis or by 
engaging in a distancing maneuver. The hypothesis posits that it really was 
McQuirter‘s intent to rape Mrs. Ted Allen, in which case the guilty verdict 
was a just one. The distancing reaction assumes that, whether or not 
McQuirter intended to rape Mrs. Ted Allen, the significance of the case is 
entirely historical—a vestigial relic of how easy it was to bring rape 
charges against black men in the South, at least where there was a white 
―victim.‖  
For me, McQuirter is not so easily cabined. It is not so easily 
dismissed. When I read and re-read McQuirter, I find that the case raises 
more questions than it answers. McQuirter raises questions about the law 
of rape. But it also raises questions about the sexualization of race, the 
racialization of rape, and ultimately the specter of not rape.  
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I begins with an overview of the 
black letter law of rape, from its common law foundation through its 
recent reforms. The point of this overview is not to be exhaustive or to 
provide a hornbook on the law of rape. Indeed, there are aspects of rape 
law—such as rape by fraud in the inducement, statutory rape, and the 
change in evidentiary rules ushered in by rape shield laws—that I put to 
the side almost entirely.
17
 Rather, the point of the overview is to show that 
any understanding of the development of the black letter law of rape in 
this country is incomplete without an understanding of what I have termed 
the ―white letter law of rape.‖18 Though rarely made explicit, this white 
 
 
 17. For an overview of these issues, I cannot recommend more Joshua Dressler‘s chapter on rape 
in Understanding Criminal Law. See DRESSLER, supra note 8, at 617–41. For entirely different 
reasons, I also put to the side other types of rape, such as same-sex rape. This is not to diminish the 
harm of same-sex rape, which occurs far more frequently than most individuals realize. See, e.g., 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NO ESCAPE: MALE RAPE IN U.S. PRISONS (2001); MALE VICTIMS OF 
SEXUAL ASSAULT (Gillian C. Mezey & Michael B. King eds., 1992); Alice Ristroph, Sexual 
Punishments, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 139 (2006). Rather, it is an acknowledgement that it is male 
perpetrator–female victim rape that has driven, shaped, and informed the law of rape and the law of 
not rape, which this Article critiques.  
 18. I first introduced the concept ―white letter law‖ in an earlier article. See I. Bennett Capers, 
The Trial of Bigger Thomas: Race, Gender, and Trespass, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 7–8 
(2006). Unlike black letter law—which brings to mind ―statutory law, the written law, the easily 
discernible law set forth as black letters on a white page‖—―white letter law‖ suggests ―societal and 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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letter law of rape often governs the application of the black letter law, 
determining its presumptions and reallocating its burdens of proof and 
persuasion. But it is more than this. It also informs which complainants are 
believed, which suspects are prosecuted and convicted, and the severity of 
their punishment. Understanding this white letter law of rape is a first step 
in arguing for a change in the law of rape. And it is the first step in arguing 
for a change in the law of not rape. 
Part II focuses on the issue of mens rea in rape cases, and argues that 
here, too, the sexualization of race and the racialization of rape matters. 
There is something akin to presumption of criminal intent in rape cases 
involving black male defendants and white female complainants. Equally 
troubling, when it comes to the defense of reasonable belief in the 
presence of consent, there seems to be a presumption of un-reasonability. 
Part III returns to the case of McQuirter v. State, and questions the 
reforms pressed by feminist legal scholars. Finally, Part IV attempts to 
answer the question that, more than any other, motivates this Article: What 
if McQuirter was an unintentional rapist? By this I mean, what happens 
when we: (i) assume that McQuirter did not have the intent to rape Mrs. 
Ted Allen; (ii) assume that Mrs. Ted Allen nonetheless perceived 
McQuirter to have the intent to rape; and (iii) reorient ourselves to look at 
the case from McQuirter‘s perspective? Is it possible to recast McQuirter 
not as the defendant, but as a crime victim, with Mrs. Ted Allen cast as the 
perpetrator? Can we reframe McQuirter v. State into a hypothetical State 
v. Allen? Should we?  
My approach to rape law is unconventional, to be sure. Part of this has 
to do with who I am. In Susan Estrich‘s influential Yale Law Journal 
Article, ―Rape,‖ she begins with her own story of being raped by a black 
man—the cops derogatorily refer to him as a ―crow‖—and the 
acknowledgment that as a rape victim, she is neither unbiased, nor an 
objective observer.
19
 In her subsequent book, Real Rape, she continues, 
―In writing about rape, I am writing about my own life.‖20 She explicitly 
calls into question the very notion of objectivity when it comes to the law 
of rape, which, until the 1970s, was largely written by men.
21
 Privileged 
white men, to be more specific.  
 
 
normative laws that stand side by side with, and often undergird, black letter law but, as if inscribed in 
white ink on white paper, remain invisible to the naked eye.‖ Id.  
 19. Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1087 (1986). 
 20. SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 3 (1987).  
 21. Estrich, supra note 19, at 1089 & n.2. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss6/3
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Like Estrich, I, too, want to put my cards on the table. Like Estrich, I 
make no claim to be unbiased or objective—except I am not a rape victim, 
at least not in the conventional sense. Rather, I am someone whose voice 
and point of view have been absent too long from rape law discourse. In 
Estrich‘s story, I would be the crow. I am a black man who teaches rape to 
mostly white students. I am a black man living in a country where 
encounters with overt racism are now rare,
22
 but where encounters with 
unacknowledged and implicit biases about race and sexuality are a daily 
occurrence. In 1950s Alabama, I could easily have been McQuirter. Now, 
when I go on solitary evening strolls in the predominantly white 
neighborhood where I live, I am not afraid that I will be arrested, 
prosecuted, and convicted of ―attempt to commit assault with the intent to 
commit rape.‖23 But I do know that to many unaccompanied women, my 
race and gender prefigure me as a potential rapist. To many 
unaccompanied women, I am still McQuirter. Just walking in my 
neighborhood, I am both raced and sexualized. In short, I become a rapist. 
I. THE BLACK LETTER/WHITE LETTER LAW OF RAPE 
A. The Black Letter Law of Rape 
The black letter law of rape has always been deceptively simple. At 
English common law, it was defined as ―carnal knowledge of a woman 
forcibly and against her will,‖24 and was understood as including three 
basic elements: vaginal intercourse, force, and non-consent.
25
 American 
jurisdictions adopted these basic elements, and even today, most rape 
statutes have these elements as their foundation.
26
  
This is not to suggest that the proof required to establish each of these 
three elements—vaginal intercourse, force, and non-consent—has 
remained constant. Initially, proof of force required not only proof that the 
 
 
 22. As several scholars have noted, while forms of overt racism have declined, structural or 
institutional racism continues to act as a barrier to equality. See generally I. Bennett Capers, Policing, 
Race, and Place, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 43 (2009); Ian F. Haney López, Institutional Racism: 
Judicial Conduct and a New Theory of Racial Discrimination, 109 YALE L.J. 1717, 1726–27 (2000); 
Russell K. Robinson, Perceptual Segregation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1130 (2008); Julie C. Suk, 
Procedural Path Dependence: Discrimination and the Civil-Criminal Divide, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 
1315, 1320–21 (2008). 
 23. McQuirter v. State, 63 So. 2d 388, 388 (Ala. Ct. App. 1953). 
 24. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *210. 
 25. SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 318 
(7th ed. 2001).  
 26. See id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1352 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 87:1345 
 
 
 
 
defendant had acted forcibly in engaging in intercourse; it also required 
proof that the complainant responded to his force with force of her own.
27
 
As such, rape was one of the few crimes where the actions of the 
defendant alone were by definition insufficient to satisfy the elements of 
the crime. His force might render him guilty of assault or battery, but it 
would not render him guilty of rape unless there was also a specified 
reaction from the victim: utmost resistance.
28
 Both the quantity and the 
quality of her response were put on trial, deliberated over and adjudicated. 
Indeed, proof of her response was necessary for two elements: to prove 
that the defendant‘s force was really force, and to prove that the victim‘s 
non-consent—no matter how many times expressed verbally—was really 
non-consent. As one court put it, ―Not only must there be entire absence of 
mental consent or assent, but there must be the most vehement exercise of 
every physical means or faculty within the woman‘s power to resist the 
penetration of her person, and this must be shown to persist until the 
offense is consummated.‖29 Or as another court put it in explaining the 
utmost resistance requirement, ―[I]f a woman, aware that it will be done 
unless she does resist, does not resist to the extent of her ability on the 
occasion, must it not be that she is not entirely reluctant?‖30 In short, early 
rape law allowed men something akin to a ―woman‘s failure of actus reus 
defense.‖31 
This was the law initially. By the 1960s and 1970s, this requirement 
that women resist to the utmost had given way to the requirement that they 
resist when it is reasonable to do so.
32
 The 1981 case of State v. Rusk
33
 
illustrates this shift. In Rusk, the Maryland Court of Appeals, sitting en 
banc, upheld a conviction for rape where the victim—who met the 
defendant at a bar and gave him a ride home, where she was pressured to 
come up to his room and pressured to have sex—failed to physically resist 
at all.
34
 In a departure from the prior requirement that a victim resist to the 
 
 
 27. DRESSLER, supra note 8, at 627–28.  
 28. JOHN KAPLAN ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 904–05 (5th ed. 2004). 
 29. Brown v. State, 106 N.W. 536 (Wis. 1906). 
 30. People v. Dohring, 59 N.Y. 374, 384 (1874). 
 31. Anne M. Coughlin, Sex and Guilt, 84 VA. L. REV. 1, 36 (1998). 
 32. This change was largely the result of activism by women‘s rights groups, who pointed out 
that rape was the only crime where the victim had to ―prove‖ herself and was in effect ―put on trial 
along with the defendant to have [her] conduct judged.‖ JOHN DELANEY, LEARNING CRIMINAL LAW 
AS ADVOCACY ARGUMENT 308 (2004) (citing Snyder, Reform of New York’s Rape Law Proposed, 
N.Y. L.J., Dec. 14, 1978, at 4). 
 33. 424 A.2d 720 (Md. 1981). 
 34. Id. at 724, 728. According to the prosecutrix, she repeatedly declined to accompany the 
defendant to his apartment, and only did so after he grabbed her car keys. Id. at 721. Once in the 
apartment, defendant asked her to remove her clothes and she did. Id. at 722. She testified: 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss6/3
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utmost no matter what, the court ruled that since her failure to resist was 
based on her reasonable fear, resistance was excused.
35
 That this decision 
was four to three, with the three dissenters invoking ―the natural instinct of 
every proud female to resist,‖36 illustrates what a difficult shift it has been. 
In the last few decades, there has also been a shift in the emphasis 
placed on certain elements. Jurisdictions initially placed primary emphasis 
on the use of force, as evidenced by resistance or reasonable resistance, in 
determining whether a rape had occurred.
37
 Indeed, in the 1950s, the 
authors of the Model Penal Code defined rape almost entirely based on the 
presence of force,
38
 as did several jurisdictions influenced by the Model 
Penal Code.
39
 Since the 1980s, however, the trend has been to de-
emphasize the presence of force and to instead emphasize the absence of 
consent.
40
 New Jersey, for example, no longer requires proof of any force 
beyond the force inherent in the act of sexual penetration. In In re 
M.T.S.,
41
 the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that a person commits 
forcible rape when he commits an act of penetration in the absence of 
affirmative and freely given permission;
42
 in short, the force inherent in 
the sexual act itself satisfies the force requirement. Another case 
 
 
 I was still begging him to please let, you know, let me leave. I said, ―you can get a lot of 
other girls down there, for what you want,‖ and he just kept saying, ―no;‖ and then I was 
really scared, because I can‘t describe, you know, what was said. It was more the look in his 
eyes; and I said, at that point—I didn‘t know what to say; and I said, ―If I do what you want, 
will you let me go without killing me?‖ Because I didn‘t know, at that point, what he was 
going to do; and I started to cry; and when I did, he put his hands on my throat, and started 
lightly to choke me; and I said, ―If I do what you want, will you let me go?‖ And he said, yes, 
and at that time, I proceeded to do what he wanted me to. 
Id. at 722. 
 35. Id. at 726. The court ruled that a reasonably grounded fear ―obviate[s] the need for either 
proof of actual force on the part of the assailant or physical resistance on the part of the victim.‖ Id. at 
727. 
 36. Id. at 733 (Cole, J., dissenting). 
 37. DRESSLER, supra note 8, at 625–35. 
 38. MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 213.1(1)(a); see also Deborah W. Denno, Why the 
Model Penal Code’s Sexual Offense Provisions Should Be Pulled and Replaced, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. 
L. 207, 210 (2003). 
 39. ESTRICH, supra note 20, at 59; see also Matthew R. Lyon, Note, No Means No?: Withdrawal 
of Consent During Intercourse and the Continuing Evolution of the Definition of Rape, 95 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 277, 284–85 (2004). 
 40. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3252(a)(1) (2009) (criminalizing nonconsensual sex); 
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.225(4) (West 2005); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.20(1) (McKinney 2009) 
(defining sexual misconduct as sexual intercourse without consent); In re M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266 (N.J. 
1992) (redefining rape to include nonconsensual sex). See generally DRESSLER, supra note 8, at 632–
33; Aya Gruber, Rape, Feminism, and the War on Crime, 84 WASH. L. REV. 581, 601 (2004). 
 41. 609 A.2d 1266 (N.J. 1992). 
 42. Id. at 1277. 
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1354 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 87:1345 
 
 
 
 
illustrating the growing emphasis on consent is People v. John Z.
43
 In John 
Z., the California Supreme Court upheld a conviction where the victim 
consented to intercourse with the defendant, but withdrew consent after 
the intercourse had begun.
44
 Even State v. Rusk illustrates this trend to a 
certain extent, since there, the Maryland Court of Appeals suggested that 
the need for proof of actual force by the assailant may be obviated by 
proof of reasonably grounded fear on the part of the victim.
45
  
There have been other changes as well. Under traditional common law, 
the crime of rape did not apply to husbands who forced their wives to have 
sex, even when such force was accompanied by physical violence.
46
 The 
thinking was that by consenting to marriage, women necessarily consented 
to permanent access,
47
 or, in the alternative, that by consenting to 
marriage, the personage of the wife had been ―incorporated and 
consolidated into that of the husband.‖48 At the urging of feminist 
scholars, this marital immunity has been all but eliminated, though 
remnants of the rule appear in more than a half dozen states.
49
 States have 
also broadened the definition of prohibited conduct to include conduct 
other than penile-vaginal intercourse, and have revised their rape statutes 
to make them gender neutral (allowing for the prosecution of female 
perpetrators and/or rapes involving male victims).
50
 
These substantive changes to the rape law have not been 
inconsequential.
51
 But at bottom, they have been changes at the margins. 
 
 
 43. 60 P.3d 183 (Cal. 2003). 
 44. Id. at 186–88. 
 45. 424 A.2d 720, 727 (Md. 1981). 
 46. 1 MATTHEW HALE, HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONAE [HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE 
CROWN] *628–29. See generally DIANA E.H. RUSSELL, RAPE IN MARRIAGE 17 (rev. ed. 1990); Jill 
Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1373 (2000). 
 47. Sir Matthew Hale put it more delicately: ―[B]y their mutual matrimonial consent and contract 
the wife hath given up herself in this kind unto her husband, which she cannot retract.‖ HALE, supra 
note 46, at *629. 
 48. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *430. 
 49. See Michelle J. Anderson, Marital Immunity, Intimate Relationships, and Improper 
Inferences: A New Law on Sexual Offenses by Intimates, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1465, 1468 & nn.9–13 
(2003). 
 50. There have been other changes in rape law as well. The requirement in many jurisdictions 
that a rape victim‘s account be corroborated has been eliminated, DRESSLER, supra note 8, at 642–43, 
as well as the requirement that a rape victim make a ―prompt complaint.‖ KAPLAN ET AL., supra note 
28, at 901. Rape shield laws, similar to those codified in Federal Rule of Evidence 412, limit inquiry at 
trial into the victim‘s sexual history and reputation. Id.; see also FED. R. EVID. 412. Courts have also 
abandoned the practice of giving cautionary instructions to juries alerting them that accusations of rape 
are easy to fabricate and thus deserve special scrutiny. DRESSLER, supra note 8, at 642–43  
 51. Of course, several scholars have made the opposite point: that these changes have been 
inconsequential. They make the empirical claim that these changes have been largely ineffectual in 
changing the application of rape law in terms of which rapes are prosecuted and result in convictions. 
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Though the emphasis on the elements may have changed, the basic black 
letter definition of rape continues to prohibit sexual intercourse by force 
and without consent. The point here is not to assay this definition, but to 
show that the definition ―really explains very little.‖52 It is neither 
descriptive nor predictive of rape law as applied. And one main reason that 
it is incomplete is because it obscures the sexualization of race and the 
racialization of rape. 
B. The Black Letter/White Letter Law of Rape 
To fully understand the story of the law of rape in this country, one 
must understand how the law of rape has been shaped by the law of race.  
1. Explicit Laws 
Historically, the interplay between the law of rape and the law of race 
was explicit. This was especially true in the case of punishment. Early 
Pennsylvania law, for example, specified that blacks convicted of raping, 
or attempting to rape, white women were to be punished by castration.
53
 
Missouri and Kansas similarly provided for castration.
54
 The Virginia 
Code, after initially authorizing castration, authorized the death penalty for 
a black convicted of raping a white woman, but set the maximum 
punishment for a white convicted of rape at twenty years‘ imprisonment.55 
Other states followed a similar practice, removing capital punishment in 
rape cases for white defendants, but retaining it for slaves and in some 
cases for all blacks, slave and free, convicted of either raping or attempting 
to rape white women.
56
  
 
 
See Ronet Bachman & Raymond Paternoster, A Contemporary Look at the Effects of Rape Law 
Reform: How Far Have We Really Come?, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 554 (1993); Wallace D. 
Loh, The Impact of Common Law and Reform Rape Statutes on Prosecution: An Empirical Study, 55 
WASH. L. REV. 543, 613 (1980). These arguments, however, miss a larger point. If nothing else, 
reforms have had a signaling function about what conduct is tolerated, instilling a kind of self-policing. 
 52. KAPLAN ET AL., supra note 28, at 897. 
 53. An Act for the Trial of Negroes, ch. LXI, § IV, 1700 Pa. Laws 79.  
 54. An Act Concerning Crimes and Punishments, § 99, 1825 Mo. Laws 312; see also Jennifer 
Wriggins, Note, Rape, Racism, and the Law, 6 HARV. WOMEN‘S L.J. 103, 105 n.8 (1983) (citing 
Kansas Compilation of 1855). 
 55. For more on these early laws, see WINTHROP D. JORDAN, THE WHITE MAN‘S BURDEN 81–82 
(1974); see also Donald H. Partington, The Incidence of the Death Penalty for Rape in Virginia, 22 
WASH & LEE L. REV. 43 (1965); Wriggins, supra note 54, at 105 n.8 (1983). 
 56. THOMAS D. MORRIS, SOUTHERN SLAVERY AND THE LAW, 1619–1860, at 305 (1996). 
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As the foregoing suggests, both the race of the defendant and the race 
of the complainant mattered. In Grandison v. State,
57
 for example, the 
court ruled that the race of the prosecutrix ―must be charged in the 
indictment and proved‖ at trial.58 The court explained, ―Such an act 
committed upon a black woman would not be punished with death,‖ since 
it is the white race of the victim that ―gives to the offense its enormity 
. . . .‖59 In Pleasant v. State,60 the court reversed the conviction of a slave 
accused of raping a white woman where the issue of her whiteness was not 
proved to the jury. As the court put it, ―a fair complexion is not 
inconsistent with the taint of negro blood‖; proof that her grandfather was 
a negro would preclude the defendant being sentenced to death.
61
 
2. Indirect Laws 
At other times, the black letter law of race operated indirectly to inform 
the law of rape. For example, it is impossible to fully understand the 
dominant response to even the specter of interracial rape without 
understanding our 300-year history of prohibiting interracial marriage
62
 
and even interracial sexual intercourse.
63
 These antimiscegenation statutes, 
if they did not dictate the outcome of rape allegations, at least limited the 
range of possibilities.
64
 Imagine, for a second, that McQuirter had been 
white.
65
 It is possible that the cops who arrested him, or the prosecutor 
 
 
 57. 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 451 (1841). 
 58. Id. at 452. 
 59. Id. A Yale Law Journal Article expressed a similar sentiment, bidding its readers to: 
―[C]onsider how profoundly humiliated any woman must feel who has been the victim of [rape], and 
how, under existing social conditions, this humiliation must be greatly intensified by the wrong having 
been committed by a negro . . . .‖ Wm. Reynolds, The Remedy for Lynch Law, 7 YALE L.J. 20, 21 
(1897). 
 60. 13 Ark. 360 (1853). 
 61. Id. at 376. 
 62. As many as thirty-eight states at one time banned interracial marriage. See RACHEL F. 
MORAN, INTERRACIAL INTIMACY: THE REGULATION OF RACE & ROMANCE 17 (2001); see also 
Edward Stein, Past and Present Proposed Amendments to the United States Constitution Regarding 
Marriage, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 611, 627–28 (2004). At the time Loving v. Virginia was decided in 1967, 
invalidating all antimiscegenation laws, sixteen states had such statutes. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 
1, 6 & n.5 (1967). 
 63. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (invalidating a statute authorizing 
greater penalties for interracial cohabitation and adultery). In so holding, the Court overruled its prior 
decision in Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883), upholding a similar Alabama statute.  
 64. Ida B. Wells, one of the most prominent African American intellectuals of the late-nineteenth 
century, also noted the interrelation between antimiscegenation laws and rape. See IDA B. WELLS, 
SOUTHERN HORRORS: LYNCH LAW IN ALL ITS PHASES 8 (1892). 
 65. On the advantages that obtain from using switching exercises to override inappropriate biases 
in the criminal law, see I. Bennett Capers, Cross Dressing and the Criminal, 20 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 
1 (2008). 
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who filed charges, or the judge who tried him, or the jury that decided his 
fate would have speculated that McQuirter did notice Mrs. Ted Allen. 
They may have even concluded that he did intentionally follow her and 
did intentionally wait outside her home. But switch McQuirter‘s race, and 
they could easily have concluded that McQuirter‘s actions were all in 
courtship, all in seduction. The fact that Alabama prohibited even 
consensual interracial intercourse contributed to making that option 
unimaginable.
66
 
3. White Letter Laws and the Resistance Requirement 
Most of the time, however, a type of unwritten law of race, what I have 
termed ―white letter law‖67—suggesting near invisibility, something akin 
to laws ―inscribed in white ink on white paper‖68—dictated whether the 
elements of the crime of rape had been satisfied; indeed, whether the 
elements were even capable of being satisfied. Even under Blackstone‘s 
definition that rape was ―carnal knowledge of a woman forcibly and 
against her will,‖69 jurisdictions in this country applied a type of white 
letter law exemption. It was understood, for example, that the definition of 
rape did not prohibit the rape of black slaves,
70
 or, for that matter, slave 
children.
71
  
The unwritten white letter law of rape held particular sway following 
ratification of the Reconstruction Amendments, when explicit distinctions 
based on race in criminal statutes risked invalidation under the Fourteenth 
Amendment‘s Equal Protection Clause. Evidence of this can be seen in the 
black letter law‘s initial requirement of proof that the victim resisted to the 
utmost before a conviction of rape would be sustained. Though the 
―utmost resistance‖ requirement was clear, what it meant in practice—in 
terms of which victims were believed, which men were prosecuted, and 
 
 
 66. Indeed, in Dorsey v. State, the Georgia Supreme Court allowed race to be considered to rebut 
this very possibility. Dorsey v. State, 34 S.E. 135, 136–37 (Ga. 1899). 
 67. See Capers, supra note 18, at 7–8. 
 68. Id. at 8. 
 69. BLACKSTONE, supra note 24, at *210. 
 70. MORRIS, supra note 56, at 305–06; see also Sharon Block, Lines of Color, Sex, and Service: 
Comparative Sexual Coercion in Early America, in SEX, LOVE, RACE: CROSSING BOUNDARIES IN 
NORTH AMERICAN HISTORY 141 (Martha Hodes ed., 1999); Catherine Clinton, ―With a Whip in His 
Hand‖: Rape, Memory, and African-American Women, in HISTORY AND MEMORY IN AFRICAN-
AMERICAN CULTURE 205, 211 (Geneviève Fabre & Robert O‘Meally eds., 1994). 
 71. See, e.g., George v. State, 37 Miss. 316, 318 (1859) (dismissing rape indictment because 
victim, who was under the age of ten, was a slave, and hence not protected by the criminal law). 
Mississippi subsequently revised its law to prohibit the rape of black or mulatto females under twelve, 
but only if the rape was committed by another black or mulatto. 
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which defendants were found guilty—turned on what was often unsaid, 
i.e., the white letter law. As Susan Estrich aptly observed in her analysis of 
cases from this period, resistance itself was color-dependent: ―white 
women [were] not required to resist black men . . . .‖72 
Two cases illustrate this point. In Brown v. State,
73
 a sixteen-year-old 
girl was forced to the ground as she walked across the field to her 
grandmother‘s house. The court did not dispute that she screamed as hard 
as she could, repeatedly tried to get up, clawed at the grass, and kept 
screaming until her attacker almost strangled her.
74
 Nonetheless, the court 
concluded that her attacker (white) was not guilty of rape because she 
didn’t resist enough.75 By contrast, Hart v. Commonwealth76 involved a 
seventeen-year-old girl who was attacked by ―a full-grown negro man‖ but 
did not cry for help when two white men were in earshot; instead, she 
freed herself and ―walk[ed] to the nearest house‖ to call for help.77 That 
she could have done more to resist, and therefore did not resist to the 
utmost, was beside the point. The white-letter law of rape dictated that 
there was more than enough evidence to overlook the ―utmost resistance‖ 
requirement and find her attacker guilty of attempted rape. After all, he 
was a ―full-grown negro man.‖ Indeed, the white letter law dictated that 
there was more than enough to affirm Hart‘s sentence for the crime of 
attempting to rape a white woman: death.  
In short, though the black letter law was, at least on the books, ―color-
blind,‖ the white letter law provided caveats and exceptions that were 
color-coded.
78
 In cases involving black defendants and white 
 
 
 72. ESTRICH, supra note 20, at 36. In Estrich‘s account, the ―appropriateness‖ of the relationship 
determined whether, in practice, the resistance requirement would be applied. 
Strangers need not be resisted, even if unarmed; dates must be. A stepdaughter is not required 
to resist her stepfather, but she is required to resist the boy or man next-door. Adult women 
are required to resist when the man is an adult neighbor, but not when he is a drunken youth. 
White women are not required to resist black men, but black women are. 
Id. Stephen Schulhofer makes a similar observation regarding race. ―[T]he stringent force requirement 
[the precursor to resistance] was usually ignored when a black defendant was accused of raping a 
white woman.‖ STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION AND THE 
FAILURE OF LAW 24 (1998). 
 73. 106 N.W. 536, 537 (Wis. 1906). 
 74. Id. at 537. 
 75. Id. at 538–39. 
 76. 109 S.E. 582, 583 (Va. 1921). 
 77. Id. at 583 (emphasis added). 
 78. This is not to suggest that color was the only way in which the white letter law was coded. It 
was also coded in a host of other ways, including class, status, and something that is perhaps best 
understood as idealization. Just as women at times have been held up to an ideal standard of beauty 
and behavior—during the nineteenth century, white, young, chaste, gender-conforming, and of a 
particular class—we have understood rape in terms of ideal rape victims and ideal rapists. The 
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complainants, the defendant‘s blackness operated to relieve the 
prosecution of the burden of proving utmost resistance.
79
 This was true 
regardless of the social standing of the white complainant. As one court 
infamously put it in a case involving rape charges brought by a white 
prostitute: 
[T]hough a white woman be a prostitute, the presumption is strong, 
nearly conclusive . . . that she will not yield—has not yielded—even 
in her confirmed depravity, to commerce with a negro charged with 
an offense against her person.
80
 
Or as the judge in the Scottsboro trial of nine black youths put it: 
 Where the woman charged to have been raped, as in this case is 
a white woman[,] there is a very strong presumption under the law 
that she would not and did not yield voluntarily to intercourse with 
the defendant, a Negro; and this is true, whatever the station in life 
the prosecutrix may occupy, whether she be the most despised, 
ignorant and abandoned woman of the community, or the spotless 
virgin and daughter of a prominent home of luxury and learning.
81
 
By the 1960s and 1970s, of course, the requirement that women resist 
to the utmost had given way to the requirement that they resist when it is 
reasonable to do so. But again, this black letter requirement had a white 
letter emendation. Whether or not the victim‘s decision to resist was 
reasonable, i.e., whether she was reasonably put in fear of her attacker, 
could now simply turn on the race of the defendant. In other words, the 
 
 
likelihood of prosecution and likely outcome have often depended on how closely the actual rape 
matches on to our preconceptions of the ideal rape victim and the ideal rapist. For more about the 
effect of victim status, see Gary D. LaFree et al., Jurors’ Responses to Victims’ Behavior and Legal 
Issues in Sexual Assault Trials, 32 SOC. PROBS. 389 (1985). 
 79. See Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, ―The Mind That Burns in Each Body‖: Women, Rape, and Racial 
Violence, in POWERS OF DESIRE: THE POLITICS OF SEXUALITY 328, 336 (Ann Snitow et al. eds., 1983) 
(noting that in situations involving a black man and a white woman, ―intercourse was prima facie 
evidence of rape‖); Dorothy E. Roberts, Rape, Violence, and Women’s Autonomy, 69 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 359, 363 (1993) (―Courts often appear to be asking the question, ‗How much force should we 
allow this type of man to use against this type of woman?‘ Very little force, if any, was required to 
convict a Black man of raping a white woman.‖); Wriggins, supra note 54, at 111 (―If the accused was 
Black and the victim white, the jury was entitled to draw the inference, based on race alone, that he 
intended to rape her.‖). 
 80. Story v. State, 59 So. 480, 482 (Ala. 1912).  
 81. DAN T. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH 297 (1969). In the 
Scottsboro Boys case, nine black youths were repeatedly convicted of raping two white women on a 
freight train, notwithstanding the fact that one of the women testified for the defense and admitted that 
they had fabricated the accusation, or the fact that the medical evidence contradicted the claim. See 
generally id.  
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presence of a black man was often enough to raise a presumption of 
reasonable fear. As the court put it in People v. Harris,
82
 in a rape case 
involving a ―young, white woman returning home‖ and encountering a 
―strange, male person of the Negro race‖ on a quiet street, ―it would 
border upon the stupid to find that she freely acquiesced in his acts as he 
ravished her body. While she made some resistance, it may be safely 
presumed that she would have rebelled with a vengeance but for her fear 
of bodily harm.‖83 After all, the defendant was a ―strange, male person of 
the Negro race.‖ 
4. White Letter Laws and Punishment 
In addition, long after the black letter law ceased to explicitly mete 
punishment for rape along lines of race, the white letter law still did. 
Between 1930 and 1967, 89% of all of the men officially executed for rape 
in the United States were black.
84
 This does not include unofficial 
executions committed through lynching, which would certainly result in 
an even higher percentage of executions.
85
 Focusing solely on legal 
executions for rape, a study concluded that the overwhelming majority 
(85%) involved a particular dyad—black male defendants and white 
female victims—and that a black man found guilty of raping a white 
woman was eighteen times more likely to receive a death sentence than an 
offender in any other offender-victim dyad.
86
 Perhaps most revealing: no 
one, white or black, has been executed for raping a black woman,
87
 
notwithstanding the absence of significant variation in the rate of 
victimization of white women and black women.
88
  
This racial disparity in rape executions has not gone unnoticed by the 
Court. Concerns about this disparity were at the heart of Justice Douglas‘s 
 
 
 82. 238 P.2d 158 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1951). 
 83. Id. at 160. 
 84. See Marvin E. Wolfgang, Racial Discrimination in the Death Sentence for Rape, in 
EXECUTIONS IN AMERICA 110–20 (William J. Bowers ed., 1974). 
 85. In the nineteenth century, lynchings in fact outnumbered state-sponsored executions. In the 
first few decades of the twentieth century, such lynchings constituted about a third of all executions. 
See WILLIAM J. BOWERS, EXECUTIONS IN AMERICA 40–44 (1974). 
 86. Marvin E. Wolfgang & Marc Riedel, Race, Judicial Discretion, and the Death Penalty, 407 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 119, 130 (1973); see also Marvin E. Wolfgang & Marc Riedel, 
Rape, Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 
99, 111 (Hugo Adam Bedau & Chester M. Pierce eds., 1976). 
 87. See Coramae Richey Mann & Lance H. Seva, The Sexualization of Racism: The Black as 
Rapist and White Justice, 3 J. BLACK STUD. 168, 173 (1979). 
 88. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, NCJ-205455, CRIMINAL 
VICTIMIZATION, 2003, at 7 (2004). 
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and Justice Marshall‘s concurrences in Furman v. Georgia,89 and at the 
heart of Court‘s decision in Coker v. Georgia,90 in which the Court 
invoked the Eighth Amendment‘s implied proportionality principle to 
abolish the death penalty as a possible punishment for rape. But in 
addressing one problem, that of race-based executions, the Coker decision 
left unaddressed another. Though black men are no longer executed for the 
crime of rape alone, a type of white letter law of punishment continues to 
persist with respect to non-capital sentences.  
Consider the results of Gary LaFree‘s study of the racial disparity in 
prosecution and sentencing in rape cases.
91
 LaFree examined the impact of 
race composition in nine separate processing decisions in the 881 forcible-
sex offenses reported to the Indianapolis police during a three-year 
period.
92
 His findings, represented in the graph below,
93
 support the 
conclusion that the racial composition of the defendant-victim dyad is a 
significant factor in several of the processing decisions.  
 
Although black men accused of assaulting black women accounted for 
45% of the reported rapes, they accounted for only 16.7% of the men who 
 
 
 89. 408 U.S. 238, 240, 255 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring); 408 U.S. at 364–65 (Marshall, J., 
concurring). 
 90. 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (holding that the imposition of death for the crime of rape of an 
adult woman was grossly disproportionate in violation of the Eighth Amendment). 
 91. GARY D. LAFREE, RAPE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUAL 
ASSAULT 129 (1989). 
 92. Id. at 129–31. 
 93. Id. at 132. 
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received sentences of six or more years.
94
 ―By contrast, black men accused 
of assaulting white women,‖ though accounting for only 23% of the 
reported rapes, accounted ―for 50 percent of all men who received 
sentences of six or more years.‖95 Indeed, as the graph reveals, LaFree 
found that ―the percentage of cases involving black suspects and white 
victims steadily increased‖ from the reported crime stage to the sentencing 
stage, while ―the percentage of black intraracial assaults steadily declined, 
and the percentage of white intraracial assaults remained relatively 
constant.‖96 A multivariate analysis controlling for the strength of the 
evidence, criminal history, and other case characteristics also supported 
the conclusion that a black-white dyad was a significant factor in several 
decisions, including the decision to bring felony charges (as opposed to 
lesser charges) and in the place and length of sentence.
97
 A reanalysis 
controlling for the suspect-victim relationship—on the theory that stranger 
rape may be prosecuted more vigorously than acquaintance rape—did not 
change this result.
98
 A study of sentences for rape convictions in Dallas, 
Texas, reached a similar conclusion.
99
 
 
 
 94. Id. at 133. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id.  
 97. Id. at 135–40. LaFree used multivariate analysis ―to control for the possibility that legal 
differences between the cases might explain their different treatments.‖ Id. at 135. Using multiple 
correlation coefficients (R), LaFree measured ―how closely associated independent variables are‖ to 
each dependant variable. Id. at 138. The independent variables included: race-composition, the 
defendant‘s age, the defendant‘s criminal record, eyewitnesses, charge seriousness, type of trial, the 
presence of a weapon, the offense type, conviction by plea, and the victim‘s willingness to testify. Id. 
at 137. The dependent variables were nine criminal justice outcomes: arrest, charge seriousness, felony 
screening, case prosecution, trial, verdict, sentence type, place of incarceration, and sentence length. 
Id. at 130–31. 
 LaFree chose the most correlated independent variable as the best single predictor of each 
criminal justice outcome. Id. When additional predictors entered the equation, LaFree used R-square to 
determine ―how much of an additional contribution specific variables made to explaining each 
processing outcome.‖ Id. at 138. The multivariate analysis shows us that ―the inclusion of the race-
composition variables does improve prediction of outcomes appreciably . . . .‖ Id. at 138. To complete 
the multivariate analysis, LaFree reestimated the equations where the independent variables had 
significant net effect. This beta coefficient analysis showed no indication that race composition had a 
net effect on case prosecution and trial. Id. at 140–41. Overall, 
[c]ompared to other defendants, blacks who were suspected of assaulting white women 
received more serious charges, were more likely to have their cases filed as felonies, were 
more likely to receive prison sentences if convicted, were more likely to be incarcerated in 
the state penitentiary (as opposed to a jail or minimum-security facility), and received 
longer sentences on the average. 
Id. at 139–40.  
 98. Id. at 142–43. 
 99. See Ray F. Herndon, Race Tilts the Scales of Justice, DALLAS TIMES HERALD, Aug. 19, 
1990, at A1 (reporting a study, which found that the median sentence for a black man convicted of 
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Finally, there is evidence that a type of white letter law persists, sub 
stratum, even in capital cases, notwithstanding the Court‘s decision in 
Coker v. Georgia, abolishing the death penalty as punishment for rape.
100
 
Phyllis Crocker‘s examination of death sentences in Ohio based on felony-
murder convictions where the predicate felony was rape, suggests that a 
black-white dyad continues to function as an unwritten factor in imposing 
the penalty of death in felony-murder cases.
101
 For example, Crocker 
found that even though only approximately 14% of the sexual assault-
murder cases in Ohio during the period examined were interracial, these 
cases comprised 32% of the cases resulting in a sentence of death.
102
 All of 
the interracial cases found deserving of death involved white victims.
103
 
To be clear, none of this is to suggest that decision makers are racist or 
consciously take race into consideration. However, given recent studies 
documenting the prevalence of implicit biases about race,
104
 including 
implicit biases about race and dangerousness,
105
 these differences do 
 
 
raping a white woman was nineteen years, while the median sentence for a white man convicted of 
raping a black woman was ten years). 
 100. 433 U.S. 584 (1977). 
 101. See Phyllis L. Crocker, Crossing the Line: Rape-Murder and the Death Penalty, 26 OHIO 
N.U. L. REV. 689, 697–701 (2000). 
 102. Id. at 700–01 & n.58. 
 103. Id. These outcomes largely parallel other studies about the disparity in punishment for crimes 
involving black defendants and white victims. The most widely cited of these is the Baldus study. See 
David C. Baldus, Charles Pulaski, & George Woodworth, Comparative Review of Death Sentences: 
An Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 661 (1983); see also 
SAMUEL R. GROSS & ROBERT MAURO, DEATH AND DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL DISPARITIES IN 
CAPITAL SENTENCING 110 (1989); Robert J. Hunter, Paige Heather Ralph, & James Marquart, The 
Death Sentencing of Rapists in Pre-Furman Texas (1942–1971): The Racial Dimension, 20 AM. J. 
CRIM. L. 313 (1993). A more recent study found that in Maryland, while the race of victims in capital 
cases between 1978 and 1999 were roughly evenly split, in 80% of the cases where the death penalty 
was imposed, the victim was white. Adam Liptak, Death Penalty Found More Likely if Victim Is 
White, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2003, at A12. The Court considered these disparities in McCleskey v. 
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), but concluded that these disparities, ―an inevitable part of our criminal 
justice system,‖ were not ―constitutionally significant‖ enough to establish an Eighth Amendment 
violation. Id. at 312–13. 
 104. Using implicit association tests (IATs), which measure the speed with which an individual 
associates a categorical status with a characteristic, social-cognition researchers have shown that 
implicit biases continue to be widespread. Nilanjana Dasgupta, Implicit Ingroup Favoritism, Outgroup 
Favoritism, and Their Behavioral Manifestations, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 143, 146 (2004). Legal scholars 
have also called attention to implicit biases and the failure of the law, at least to date, to address them. 
See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 
CAL. L. REV. 1 (2006); Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489 (2005). 
 105. Recent studies suggest that associations between race and violence continue to be prevalent. 
See, e.g., Patricia G. Devine & Andrew J. Elliot, Are Racial Stereotypes Really Fading? The Princeton 
Trilogy Revisited, 21 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 1139, 1139–50 (1995); Jennifer L. 
Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCH. 876, 876–93 (2004); Sandra Graham & Brian S. Lowery, Priming Unconscious Racial 
Stereotypes About Adolescent Offenders, 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 438, 483–504 (2004). 
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illustrate how these biases can affect the prosecution and resolution of rape 
cases, contributing to a racial disparity in outcome.
106
 
C. Consequences 
As all of this should make clear, the black letter law of rape has always 
been just one component of the law of rape. What has given context to the 
black letter law, and informed its application, is a white letter law 
predicated on notions about race and sex.
107
 It is this white letter law that 
dictates which victims are believed and which suspects are prosecuted; 
that informs the applicable presumptions and allocates the burdens of 
persuasion; and that, invoking a racialized notion of deterrence and 
retribution,
108
 adds a thumb to the scale of punishment. This is to say 
nothing of how the white letter law likely informs the largely discretionary 
evidentiary rules that are applied in court.
109
 This white letter law 
prefigures black men as highly sexed, and prefigures white women as 
sexually unavailable. It lends substance to, and is inseparable from, the 
supposition that black men are less able to control their desire or sexual 
urges than white men, a supposition that has found expression in discourse 
 
 
 106. LaFree‘s study was not the first to document racial disparities in rape prosecutions. For an 
overview of other studies, see RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 312–26 (1997). For 
studies reaching contrary results, see Rodney Kingsnorth et al., Adult Sexual Assault: The Role of 
Racial/Ethnic Composition in Prosecution and Sentencing, 26 J. CRIM. JUST. 359 (1998); Anthony 
Walsh, The Sexual Stratification Hypothesis and Sexual Assault in Light of the Changing Conceptions 
of Race, 25 CRIMINOLOGY 153 (1987). 
 107. Conflict theory provides another way of thinking about this white letter law. Viewed through 
the lens of conflict theory, the white letter law is a compilation of unwritten but widely understood 
rules that permit powerful groups to both claim neutrality and objectivity and simultaneously maintain 
their own favorable access to certain resources, while limiting access to those resources by other, less 
powerful groups. Sexual intercourse is one such resource, and its access is determined by power 
relationships within a stratified sexual marketplace. Those in power regulate the access to this resource 
both through norms and through the force of the law. Although the black letter law may proscribe all 
forcible, nonconsensual sex, the white letter law insures certain barriers to prosecution for powerful 
insiders (in this case, privileged, white men) at the same time that it eliminates other barriers when it 
comes to prosecuting less powerful outsiders (in this case, underprivileged, black men). For more on 
conflict theory in general, see WILLIAM J. CHAMBLISS & ROBERT B. SEIDMAN, LAW, ORDER, AND 
POWER (1971); JEROME HALL, THEFT, LAW AND SOCIETY (1935).  
 108. Deterrence is racialized here because, for the consequentialist, the severity of the punishment 
is calibrated based on the race of the individuals to be deterred. Retribution is also racialized, since 
what informs the severity of the punishment is the gravity of the crime; and the gravity of the crime, in 
turn, depends upon the race of the victim and the race of the defendant. 
 109. This is true not only in how courts apply their rape shield laws, which prohibit inquiry into 
the victim‘s sexual history except in certain situations, but also how the courts apply state analogues to 
Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b) (governing the admission of other crimes evidence), 609 (governing 
impeachment through prior conviction), and more generally 401 (relevance) and 403 (allowing courts 
to exclude relevant evidence when the value of that evidence is substantially outweighed by the risk of 
unfair prejudice). See FED. R. EVID. 401, 403, 404(b), 609. 
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as diverse as Thomas Jefferson‘s Notes on Virginia110 and D.W. Griffith‘s 
Birth of a Nation.
111
 And it suggests that the original conception of rape as 
a property crime, sounding in trespass, is not entirely past.
112
 Originally, 
the rape of a woman amounted to a trespass upon a husband‘s property (in 
the case of a married woman) or father‘s property (in the case of an 
unmarried daughter), i.e., requiring recompense to him. Under our rape 
laws as applied, the trespass is no longer to a father or husband. But there 
does seem to be something akin to a trespass to a racial collective.
113
  
Little else explains the prurient frenzy that accompanies any crime 
involving a white female victim and a black male defendant—see Kobe 
Bryant; compare Mike Tyson.
114
 It is why an eighteen-year-old in Georgia 
can be prosecuted for statutory rape for sleeping with his just-shy-of-
sixteen white girlfriend.
115
 It is why, in Spike Lee‘s film Jungle Fever, 
when Wesley Snipes and his white girlfriend begin horsing around one 
night on a quiet New York street and a resident sees them and misreads 
them, the prospect of the police showing up seems so real.
116
 It is why, in 
Paul Haggis‘s film Crash, the perception that Terrence Howard has an 
expensive car and a white girlfriend is enough to prompt a police stop and 
a real assault.
117
 It is why, in 1989, so much attention was devoted to the 
Central Park jogger case.
118
 Never mind that there were 3254 other 
 
 
 110. Thomas Jefferson, Notes on Virginia, in THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON 187, 257 (Adrienne Koch & William Peden eds., 1944). 
 111. BIRTH OF A NATION (Griffith Feature Films 1915). 
 112. On rape‘s origin as a property crime, see DRESSLER, supra note 8, at 621; see also MARTHA 
CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 218, 230–36 (1999); Gayle Rubin, THE 
TRAFFIC IN WOMEN: NOTES ON A ―POLITICAL ECONOMY‖ OF SEX, in TOWARD AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF 
WOMEN 157 (Ragna R. Reiter ed., 1975). 
 113. For more on the collective ownership of race, see Cheryl J. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 
106 HARV. L. REV. 1707 (1993). For more on this concept applied to rape cases, see Capers, supra 
note 18, at 38–39; see also Katharine K. Baker, Once a Rapist? Motivational Evidence and Relevancy 
in Rape Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 563, 608 (1997) (―Some members of white culture are particularly 
offended by interracial rape not because the white woman has suffered a more egregious violation, but 
because all of white culture, its ‗law‘ and ‗system of values,‘ has been defied.‖). 
 114. For a discussion of the role of race in the media frenzy accompanying the Simpson and 
Bryant cases, see On The Media (NPR radio broadcast Aug. 8, 2008), available at http://www.onthe 
media.org/transcripts/transcripts_080803_media.html. The media devoted relatively less coverage to 
the prosecution of Mike Tyson for raping Desiree Washington, a black woman. 
 115. See Ariel Hart, Child Molesting Conviction Overturned in Georgia Classmate Case, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 4, 2004, at A20; Andrew Jacobs, Student Sex Case in Georgia Stirs Claims of Old South 
Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2004, at A14; Courtland Milloy, Marcus Dixon Doesn’t Belong in Ga. 
Prison, WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 2004, at C1. 
 116. JUNGLE FEVER (40 Acres and a Mule Filmworks 1991). 
 117. CRASH (Lions Gate Films 2005). In the film, Terrence Howard‘s ―girlfriend‖ is in fact his 
wife, who is a light-skinned African American. Id. The assumption, made explicit during the stop, is 
that the police singled them out because the police assumed that she was white. 
 118. For example, a Westlaw search of the ―allnews‖ database using the term ―central park 
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reported rapes in New York City that year, mostly of black women,
119
 
including ―one the following week involving the near decapitation of a 
black woman in Fort Tryon Park and one two weeks later of a black 
woman in Brooklyn who was robbed, raped, sodomized, and thrown down 
an air shaft of a four-story building.‖120 It is why even a pro-life advocate 
like President Nixon could condone abortion to avoid mixed-race 
offspring.
121
 It is why the release of a political ad depicting Willie Horton, 
a black man convicted of raping a white woman, could affect a 
presidential election.
122
 It is why, even still, in 2006, a single television ad 
showing a white woman seductively murmuring, ―Harold, call me,‖ could 
derail the campaign of a black candidate for U.S. senator.
123
 It is why, 
even in the liberal, tony enclave of Cape Cod, Massachusetts, discussions 
about the race of the defendant—―a big black guy,‖ reason alone to induce 
―fear‖ in at least one of the jurors—could make its way into jury 
deliberations in a rape and murder trial involving a white victim.
124
  
All of this has consequences for how we think about the black letter 
law of rape. This is particularly true of reforms made at the urging of 
feminist scholars. Consider the resistance requirement. Responding to 
concerns raised by feminist scholars about the utmost resistance 
requirement, some jurisdictions have abandoned the requirement.
125
 
 
 
jogger‖ and dates 1989 through 1990 retrieved 1710 articles. 
 119. Cf. SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 376 (1975) 
(observing that ―New York City police statistics showed that black women were more frequent victims 
of rape than white women‖). 
 120. JOAN DIDION, AFTER HENRY 255–56 (1992). 
 121. Charlie Savage, On Nixon Tapes, Ambivalence Over Abortion, Not Watergate, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 24, 2009, at A1 (discussing newly released tapes in which President Nixon discusses Roe v. Wade 
and confides to an aide, ―‗There are times when an abortion is necessary. I know that. When you have 
a black and a white,‘ he told an aide, before adding, ‗or a rape.‘‖). 
 122. In his 1988 race against Massachusetts Governor Dukakis, George Bush ran ads depicting 
Willie Horton, a black convicted killer who, while on a Massachusetts furlough program, raped a 
white woman. As Regina Austin put it, ―Willie Horton symbolized the threat that black males, aided 
by white liberal politicians, pose to innocent whites. Playing on racial fears, the ads‘ signifying [sic] 
was not limited to the criminal element; every black man was a potential Willie Horton, rapist, and 
murderer.‖ See Regina Austin, Beyond Black Demons and White Devils: Anti-Black Conspiracy 
Theorizing and the Black Public Sphere, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1021, 1024 (1995). For more on this 
appeal to race, see D. Marvin Jones, ―We’re All Stuck Here for a While‖: Law and the Social 
Construction of the Black Male, 24 J. CONTEMP. L. 35 (1998).  
 123. See Robin Toner, Ad Seen as Playing to Racial Fears, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2006, at A1, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/26/us/politics/26tennessee.html (discussing television 
ad against black senate candidate Harold Ford, Jr.); Peter Wallsten, GOP Attack Ad Draws Heat for 
Racial Overtones, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2006, A14. 
 124. See Abby Goodnough, Jurors in a Cape Cod Murder Case Testify About Racial Remarks, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2008, at A10. 
 125. For a discussion of this development, see Michelle J. Anderson, Reviving Resistance in Rape 
Law, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 953, 962–68. 
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Others, instead of abandoning the requirement in its entirety, have relaxed 
the requirement, excusing women from resisting if failure to resist is 
reasonable.
126
 In other words, if the defendant‘s words or actions create in 
the mind of the victim a reasonable fear that she would be harmed if she 
resisted, or that force would be used to overcome her resistance, resistance 
will be excused.  
But in adopting a ―reasonable woman‖ standard, states have given their 
imprimatur to a standard that has, at its core, implicit biases. In 
determining whether a ―reasonable woman‖ would be in fear, decision 
makers necessarily rely on implicit biases and heuristics that take into 
consideration the race of the defendant. The standard allows decision-
makers to conclude that a reasonable white female might be in fear of a 
black stranger, while obscuring the fact that a reasonable white female 
would not be in fear of a stranger under the identical circumstances if the 
stranger were white.
127
 Indeed, it allows decision-makers to engage in the 
same calculus and reach the same conclusion, even in cases involving 
black acquaintances. It thus eases the proof necessary in cases involving 
black men and white women. This should be of particular concern to 
feminist scholars, since it suggests that in attempting to eradicate sexism 
in rape laws, feminist scholars have entrenched an approach to analyzing 
rape allegations that is, if not overtly racist, very much racialized. 
This standard also harms black female victims,
128
 particularly in 
intraracial cases. Implicit in the reasonable resistance standard is not only 
the objective requirement that a reasonable woman might have feared 
resisting, but also the subjective requirement that the complainant was in 
fact afraid to resist.
129
 This presents a double hurdle for black victims, who 
 
 
 126. Id. 
 127. Cf. CORNEL WEST, RACE MATTERS 83 (1993) (describing a culture of fear that exists with 
respect to black men, in which fear ―is rooted in visceral feelings about black bodies fueled by sexual 
myths‖). 
 128. It should be noted that black women in rape cases also face a credibility hurdle. As Darren 
Hutchinson observed, ―the construction of black women as promiscuous causes jurors in sexual assault 
prosecutions to doubt black women‘s credibility . . . .‖ Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Ignoring the 
Sexualization of Race: Heteronormativity, Critical Race Theory and Anti-Racist Politics, 47 BUFF. L. 
REV. 1, 85 (1999). Studies confirm this. See LaFree et al., supra note 78, at 401–02 (finding that jurors 
in the thirty-eight rape trials studied were less likely to believe black complainants); Kitty Klein & 
Blanche Creech, Race, Rape, and Bias: Distortion of Prior Odds and Meaning Changes, 3 BASIC & 
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 21, 30 (1982) (finding jurors in experiments less likely to credit black rape 
victims). 
 129. See DRESSLER, supra note 8, at 628 (observing that, in general, ―both components—the 
female‘s subjective apprehension, and some conduct by the male that places her in reasonable 
apprehension of her safety—are required.‖); see also People v. Iniguez, 872 P.2d 1183, 1188 (Cal. 
1994). 
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are often treated as negligible by the law,
130
 as ―unrapeable.‖131 Even if 
decision makers imagine the ―reasonable woman‖ as a ―reasonable black 
woman,‖ they may assume that because of the race sameness, a reasonable 
black woman would not be in fear of a black man. In the alternative, if 
they view the reasonable woman as a ―reasonable white woman,‖ they 
might conclude that a reasonable woman (i.e., the reasonable white 
woman) would be afraid (the objective component), but discount the claim 
that this victim (an actual black woman) was in fact afraid (the subjective 
component), again relying on implicit biases about race.
132
 In short, while 
the reasonable resistance standard may relieve women of the burden of 
exercising the utmost requirement and thus ease the prosecution of rape 
cases, it does so at an expense that is disproportionately borne by black 
men and black women.
133
  
 
 
 130. See generally Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, 
and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1266–69 (1991); Angela P. Harris, 
Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 598–99 (1990); Roberts, 
supra note 79, at 364–69); Wriggins, supra note 54, at 117–23; Gail Elizabeth Wyatt, The 
Sociocultural Context of African American and White American Women’s Rape, 48 J. SOC. ISSUES 77 
(1992). 
 131. CAROLINE A. FORELL & DONNA M. MATTHEWS, A LAW OF HER OWN: THE REASONABLE 
WOMAN AS A MEASURE OF MAN 229 (2000). The treatment of a black rape victim in Richard Wright‘s 
1940 novel, Native Son, is particularly revealing. In the novel, which is loosely based on an actual 
case, the law assumes that Bigger, on trial for murdering a white woman, must have been motivated by 
rape, even though there is no evidence of rape. See generally RICHARD WRIGHT, NATIVE SON (1940). 
Meanwhile, even though there is proof that Bigger raped and murdered a black woman, he is charged 
neither with her rape nor her murder. Id. Rather, the law treats Bigger‘s rape and murder of the black 
woman as merely ―other crimes‖ evidence to be offered by the prosecution to prove that he in fact 
raped and murdered the white woman.  
 132. Moreover, this affects every decisional stage of the proceeding: what resources law 
enforcement will bring to bear in investigating the case; what charges, if any, will be filed; what 
resources will be allocated by prosecutors to the case; whether the case will be taken to trial; and so 
on. 
 133. State v. Alston, 312 S.E.2d 470 (N.C. 1984), illustrates this point. Alston had struck his 
girlfriend, Cottie Brown, several times during the period in which they lived together, eventually 
prompting her to break off the relationship and move in with her mother. Id. at 471. Alston tracked her 
down at the community college where she was taking classes, forcibly grabbed her arm, and told her 
she was going with him. Id. He then complained about her mother interfering in their relationship and 
threatened to ―fix‖ Brown‘s face so that her mother would see that ―he was not playing,‖ and told her 
that he had the right to have sex with her. Id. at 472. Alston then took her to the house of one his 
friends where, notwithstanding her protests, he forced her into the bedroom, told her to lay down on 
the bed, pushed apart her legs, and had intercourse with her. Id. at 472–73. She cried during the 
intercourse. Id. Notwithstanding these facts, including Alston‘s threat to ―fix‖ her face, the North 
Carolina Supreme Court concluded that there was insufficient evidence of force or even the threat of 
force to overcome the will of the victim to resist the sexual intercourse. Id. at 476. Although neither 
the race of Alston nor Brown is discussed in the case, there is ample circumstantial evidence to suggest 
that they were both African American. At least one other scholar has also made this observation. See 
Camille A. Nelson, Consistently Revealing the Inconsistencies: The Construction of Fear in the 
Criminal Law, 48 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1261, 1277–78 n.88 (2004). 
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Lastly, this standard potentially harms white women. A necessary 
corollary to taking interracial rape more seriously is taking intraracial rape 
less seriously. If it is reasonable for a white woman to fear a black man 
simply because he is black, then it stands to reason that it is less 
reasonable for a white woman to fear a white man. What this means in 
practice is that decision makers on one end
134—cops and prosecutors—are 
less likely to devote limited resources to prosecuting white intraracial rape 
than they would devote to prosecuting interracial rape.
135
 Estrich observed 
as much in describing her own rape. It is when she tells the police that her 
attacker was black that they begin ―really listening,‖ that her account 
becomes ―more believable‖ to them.136  
What the ―reasonable resistance‖ standard means on the back end is 
equally troubling, since jurors and judges are less likely to excuse 
resistance in intraracial cases. The defendant is white and was not 
brandishing a weapon, so what was there to fear? Thus, in Commonwealth 
v. Berkowitz,
137
 a court could vacate a rape conviction, finding that there 
was insufficient evidence of even the threat of force. It did not matter that 
the defendant, ignoring the victim‘s repeated protests, straddled the victim, 
tried to put his penis in her mouth, got up and locked the door, then pushed 
her onto the bed and pushed his penis into her, all while the victim kept 
 
 
 134. Front-end decision making, by the victims themselves, is equally problematic. Studies 
estimate that the vast majority of rapes go unreported. See, e.g., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. 
DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, NCJ-163392, SEX OFFENSES AND OFFENDERS 2 (1997) (estimating a 32% reporting 
rate); see also Catherine A. MacKinnon, Disputing Male Sovereignty: On United States v. Morrison, 
114 HARV. L. REV. 135, 143 & n.47 (2000) (citing studies). Studies also suggest that women are least 
likely to report acquaintance rape. See, e.g., Crystal S. Mills & Barbara J. Granoff, Date and 
Acquaintance Rape Among a Sample of College Students, 37 SOC. WORK. 504, 506 (1992) (reporting 
that, among college students surveyed, none of the twenty women who were raped reported the offense 
to the police). 
 135. Cf. Comment, Police Discretion and the Judgment that a Crime Has Been Committed—Rape 
in Philadelphia, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 277 (1968). 
 136. ESTRICH, supra note 20, at 1, 3. Indeed, Estrich notes that, in many respects, she is a ―very 
lucky rape victim, if there can be such a thing.‖ Id. at 3. She elaborates: 
[E]veryone agrees that I was ―really‖ raped. When I tell my story, no one doubts my status as 
a victim. No one suggests that I was ―asking for it.‖ . . . No one seems to identify with the 
rapist. His being black, I fear, probably makes my account more believable to some people, as 
it certainly did with the police. But the most important thing is that he was a stranger; that he 
approached me not only armed but uninvited; that he was after my money and car, which I 
surely don‘t give away lightly, as well as my body. As one person put it: ―You didn‘t really 
do anything wrong.‖ 
Id. Although Estrich briefly addresses race in Real Rape, she makes clear that race is not her focus, 
and that, for her purposes, she has ―put aside the additional problems‖ of race. Id. at 6. Had Estrich not 
―put aside‖ race, she might have noted that one of the most important reasons she was a ―lucky rape 
victim‖ is attributable to her status as a white woman. 
 137. 641 A.2d 1161, 1166 (Pa. 1994). 
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saying ―no.‖138 None of this was force that would prevent resistance from 
a person of reasonable resolution. In sum, while the reasonable resistance 
standard may benefit white women who are victims of interracial rape, it 
also raises the bar, thus harming white women who are victims of 
intraracial rape. This is all the more troubling, since the vast majority of 
rapes involving white victims are intraracial.
139
  
Again, all of this has consequences for how we think of the black letter 
law of rape. But it also has consequences for how we think about the white 
letter law of rape, and the extent to which it informs application of the 
black letter law. As the public discourse around Grutter v. Bollinger
140
 
revealed, as well as the discourse around the Seattle and Louisville 
cases,
141
 much of the public objects to the use of race in determining 
admission to institutions of higher learning.
142
 At the same time, however, 
our white letter law encourages similar racial considerations on the part of 
cops, prosecutors, and jurors in a way that reifies racial hierarchies.
143
 
Lastly, unlike the black letter law, the white letter law works in ways 
that are hard to repeal or subject to judicial invalidation or review. This is 
perhaps easiest understood by analogy. Between 1662, when Maryland 
passed the first anti-miscegenation statute, and 1967, when the Court 
decided Loving v. Virginia,
144
 as many as half of the states had laws 
criminalizing interracial intimacy.
145
 Notwithstanding the fact that Loving 
v. Virginia voided those black letter laws, white letter laws—manifested in 
 
 
 138. Id. at 1163–64. 
 139. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, NCJ-163392, SEX OFFENSES AND 
OFFENDERS 11 (1997); see also BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, NCJ-
126826, FEMALE VICTIMS OF VIOLENT CRIME 10 (1991) (seven out of every ten white rape victims 
were raped by white men). 
 140. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 141. Seattle and Louisville refers to the consolidated cases of Parents Involved in Community 
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007) and Meredith v. Jefferson County 
Board of Education, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007) (invalidating both school districts‘ integration plans). As 
the Court noted, Seattle implemented its school integration plan to combat the effects of ―racially 
identifiable housing patterns.‖ Id. at 2747. 
 142.  See, e.g., Emily Bazelon, The Next Kind of Integration, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2008, § 6 
(magazine), at 38 (noting public opposition running two-to-one against race-based preferences at the 
time Grutter was decided). 
 143. To put this differently, the white letter law permits an unwritten point system. Stranger rape? 
Check. Victim dressed appropriately? Check. White victim? Check. Black or Hispanic perpetrator? 
Jackpot. See Jeffrey J. Pokorak, Rape as a Badge of Slavery: The Legal History of, and Remedies for, 
Prosecutorial Race-of-Victim Charging Disparities, 7 NEV. L.J. 1, 40–43 (2006) (citing studies 
documenting the continued correlation between the black-white dyad and prosecutorial decision 
making in rape cases). 
 144. 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (invalidating antimiscegenation laws as violating the Equal Protection and 
Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 145. Moran, supra note 62, at 17. 
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social norms and expectations—still exist. Indeed, these white letter laws 
help explain why rates of interracial marriage remain statistically low, 
especially in those states that officially prohibited such marriages.
146
 By 
analogy, this suggests a critical limitation in the reform of racially tinged 
rape laws. While changes to the black letter law may be enacted through 
legislation, such changes, without more, are unlikely to affect how rape 
laws are applied. 
And all of this has consequences for the unintentional rapist. 
II. RACE AND MENS REA, OR RACE IPSA LOQUITUR
147
 
A. Rape and Mens Rea: An Overview 
Before rape law reform, the issue of criminal intent in rape 
prosecutions tended to be a nonissue.
148
 This makes sense when one thinks 
about it. The common law of rape, after all, required more than just proof 
of the use of force by the male. It also required proof of the use of 
responding force by the female amounting to utmost resistance, to show 
that his force really was force after all, was more than mere battery, was 
rape force, and to show that her verbal ―no‖ really meant no.149 She was 
required to ―follow the natural instinct of every proud female‖150 to 
physically resist her attacker ―until exhausted or overpowered,‖151 or, as 
another court put it, resist ―the attack in every way possible . . . until she 
was overcome by force, was insensible through fright, or ceased resistance 
from exhaustion, fear of death or great bodily harm.‖152 In a way, the 
thinking was that anything less might give the attacker the wrong 
impression. While feminists rightly attacked
153
 this standard as embodying 
sexism—as putting the victim on trial as much as the defendant—this 
standard did serve one purpose: it obviated the need to worry about the 
 
 
 146. Id. at 101 (―Legal barriers have fallen, but interracial marriages, particularly between blacks 
and whites, remain an anomaly even thirty years after the decision.‖); see also R. Richard Banks & Su 
Jin Gatlin, African American Intimacy: The Racial Gap in Marriage, 11 MICH. J. RACE & LAW 115, 
129–32 (2005). 
 147. This play on words comes from the title of Jody Armour‘s seminal article. See Jody D. 
Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur: Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians, and Involuntary 
Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 781 (1994). 
 148. Estrich, supra note 19, at 1097–98. 
 149. Id. 
 150. State v. Rusk, 424 A.2d 720, 733 (Md. 1981) (Cole, J., dissenting). 
 151. People v. Dohring, 59 N.Y. 374, 386 (1874). 
 152. King v. State, 357 S.W.2d 42, 45 (Tenn. 1962). 
 153. Estrich, supra note 19, at 1095. 
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defendant‘s mens rea with respect to the issue of the victim‘s non-consent. 
The attacker had to know.
154
 
Even when jurisdictions began to relax the utmost resistance 
requirement and instead require reasonable resistance, mens rea often 
remained a non-issue.
155
 There are at least three explanations for this. One, 
the cases that prosecutors tended to take to trial still remained, for the most 
part, stranger rape cases—where the defendant‘s knowledge, or at least 
reckless disregard, of the victim‘s non-consent could be presumed. Two, 
parties perhaps assumed that the mens rea required for rape was of the 
broad, ―exceedingly vague‖156 type that existed at common law. In other 
words, it was enough that the defendant was acting immorally or with a 
morally blameworthy state of mind.
157
 Given that common law rape 
already required force or threatened force, not to mention the fact that 
fornication itself was viewed as immoral, a morally blameworthy state of 
mind could likely be assumed. Three, mens rea had gone un-discussed for 
so long that defendants often failed to adequately raise the issue.
158
  
Two cases illustrate this last point. Recall State v. Rusk,
159
 decided in 
1981. From Rusk‘s point of view, assuming we credit his testimony, he 
met a woman at a bar, convinced her to give him a ride home, convinced 
her to come up for a nightcap, and then convinced her to have sex with 
him by kissing and petting her.
160
 As Rusk probably saw it, he was 
studlicious. He was a smooth operator who wanted to score and did. Even 
though the woman conceded that she had never physically resisted,
161
 
there is nothing in the several opinions resulting from Rusk‘s conviction to 
suggest that he ever raised the issue of mens rea or mistake of fact.  
 
 
 154. Professor Joshua Dressler puts this slightly differently: 
If a male used or threatened force to obtain intercourse, then it was evident that he purposely 
or knowingly had nonconsensual sexual relations. If his conduct was not forcible, the female 
had to resist, and this gave the male reasonable warning of her lack of consent: if he 
proceeded against her resistance, a jury could reasonably assume that he knew she did not 
want sexual relations. At a minimum, the resistance meant that the male acted recklessly or 
negligently in regard to her wishes. 
Joshua Dressler, Where We Have Been, and Where We Might Be Going: Some Cautionary Reflections 
on Rape Law Reform, 46 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 409, 431–32 (1998). 
 155. Estrich, supra note 19, at 1097–98. 
 156. Frances Bowes Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 994 (1932). 
 157. See, e.g., Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 (1952) (mens rea as ―evil-meaning 
mind‖); Commonwealth v. Buckley, 238 N.E.2d 335, 337 (Mass. 1968) (mens rea as a ―blameworthy 
condition of the mind‖); BLACKSTONE, supra note 24, at *21 (mens rea as ―vi[c]ious will‖). 
 158. Dressler, supra note 154, at 431 (noting that ―[b]efore rape law reform, the issue of mens rea 
rarely arose in rape trials‖). 
 159. 424 A.2d 720 (Md. 1981). 
 160. Id. at 723–24. 
 161. Id. at 722.  
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Commonwealth v. Sherry,
162
 decided in 1982, is even more revealing. 
In Sherry, the three defendants, all doctors, claimed that as far as they 
could tell, the nurse they had picked up at a party—and who never 
physically resisted—was into the group sex that ensued.163 In short, they 
argued that they lacked knowledge of the victim‘s non-consent, and at a 
minimum were entitled to an instruction that, unless they had actual 
knowledge of the victim‘s non-consent, they must be found not guilty.164 
The trial court refused to give the instruction, or any instruction on the 
issue of mens rea, and the highest court in Massachusetts affirmed.
165
 
What is telling is the court‘s acknowledgment that ―[w]hether a reasonable 
good faith mistake of fact as to the fact of consent is a defense to the crime 
of rape has never, to our knowledge, been decided in this 
Commonwealth.‖166 What is also telling is the court‘s reason for affirming: 
though the defendants had requested an instruction on mens rea, they had 
not requested an instruction on mistake of fact, which, to the court, was 
the gravamen of their complaint.
167
  
What has made mens rea an issue in recent years is a confluence of 
things: the growing abandonment of the resistance requirement, the 
increasing emphasis on non-consent, and the enactment of rape shield laws 
generally barring inquiry at trial into the victim‘s sexual history. And what 
has emerged is variation in how courts address the issue.  
The most famous case addressing mens rea in a rape prosecution is not 
an American case, but a British one. In Regina v. Morgan,
168
 three 
members of the Royal Air Force Academy were invited to the home of 
Morgan, their military superior, to have sex with his wife, whom he 
described as ―kinky‖ and ―turned on‖ by the use of force.169 At trial, the 
three men did not deny that they had engaged in forcible sex with the 
victim, but asserted that they should not be convicted if they mistakenly 
believed the forcible sex was consensual, even if their mistaken belief was 
unreasonable or negligently held.
170
 To the surprise and outrage of many, 
the House of Lords agreed. By a 3–2 vote, the Lords in effect held that 
rape should be treated as a specific intent crime, thus allowing an honest 
 
 
 162. 437 N.E.2d 224 (Mass. 1982). 
 163. Id. at 226–27. 
 164. Id. at 232 & n.8. 
 165. Id. at 232–33 
 166. Id. at 233. 
 167. Id.  
 168. [1976] A.C. 182 (H.L.) (U.K.). 
 169. Id. at 206. 
 170. Id. at 203–04, 214–15, 235–39. 
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mistake—regardless of whether that mistake was reasonable or not—to 
negate intent.
171
  
At another end of the spectrum, several American jurisdictions have 
rejected the idea that rape carries any mens rea requirement at all 
regarding the victim‘s lack of consent.172 Recall that in Commonwealth v. 
Sherry, the highest court in Massachusetts declined to address the issue of 
mens rea.
173
 Several years later, in Commonwealth v. Ascolillo, the court 
did address the issue and answered that no proof of mens rea was 
required.
174
 In these jurisdictions, even a reasonable belief in the victim‘s 
consent will not exculpate the defendant.  
For the most part, these approaches are the outliers. The vast majority 
of jurisdictions that have addressed the issue treat rape as a general intent 
crime, requiring only a morally blameworthy state of mind regarding the 
lack of consent.
175
 Under this standard, a person will not be guilty of rape 
if he honestly and reasonably believed that the sex act was consensual.
176
 
B. Race and Mens Rea: Presumptive Intent and Presumptive Non-Consent 
Each of these mens rea standards is problematic, and scholars have 
rightly criticized them. Susan Estrich has criticized allowing an honest, but 
negligent, belief defense on the ground that it serves as a disincentive for 
men to take care before acting.
177
 Joshua Dressler has criticized the ―no 
defense‖ rule as akin to making rape a strict-liability offense, imposing 
liability even when a defendant is acting without moral culpability.
178
  
But both of these criticisms miss a larger problem: even when we 
recognize rape as requiring a certain mens rea, we treat that mens rea 
differently. We treat it not as something the prosecution has to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt, but as a mistake of fact ―defense.‖ Though 
technically this may be a failure of proof defense, and we say that the 
burden remains with the prosecution in proving this element, in actuality, 
this is not how the ―defense‖ is treated. It is burden shifting without 
 
 
 171. Id. at 191–92. 
 172. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Ascolillo, 541 N.E.2d 570, 575 (Mass. 1989); State v. Reed, 479 
A.2d 1291, 1296 (Me. 1984); Commonwealth v. Fischer, 721 A.2d 1111, 1117 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998); 
Clifton v. Commonwealth, 468 S.E.2d 155, 158 (Va. Ct. App. 1996). 
 173. Commonwealth v. Sherry, 437 N.E.2d 224, 233 (Mass. 1982). 
 174. 541 N.E.2d at 570–72. 
 175. DRESSLER, supra note 8, at 637–38. 
 176. See, e.g., In re M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1279 (N.J. 1992); State v. Smith, 554 A.2d 713, 717 
(Conn. 1989); People v. Mayberry, 542 P.2d 1337, 1345 (Cal. 1975). 
 177. ESTRICH, supra note 20, at 98. 
 178. DRESSLER, supra note 8, at 638. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss6/3
  
 
 
 
 
2010] THE UNINTENTIONAL RAPIST 1375 
 
 
 
 
calling it burden shifting. For feminists who have argued that the crime of 
rape should be treated like other crimes in terms of burdens, this should be 
a cause for concern.  
And both of these criticisms fail to take into account the sexualization 
of race and the racialization of rape. Because of the sexualization of race, 
decision makers historically treated as a given that black men, because of 
their blackness, had the intent to ravish white women.
179
 Even when black 
men were not cast as hypersexual, their actions were often read as 
indicative of intent.
180
 Recall that in McQuirter, the Alabama Supreme 
Court suggested that in finding intent to rape, the jury could consider 
―racial differences, such as that the prosecutrix was a white woman and 
the defendant was a Negro man.‖181 And McQuirter is not alone. In North 
Carolina, a black sharecropper and father of nine was charged with assault 
for having ―leered‖ at a ―pretty 17-year-old blonde‖ woman.182 The 
woman testified that the defendant ―looked at [her] funny,‖ though he got 
no closer than ―about 75 feet.‖183 Even black children have been cast as 
having an intent to rape. Again in North Carolina, two black boys, ages six 
and seven, were sentenced to twelve years‘ imprisonment for attempted 
rape when their six-year-old white female playmate kissed one of the boys 
on the cheek.
184
  
At the same time that something akin to presumptive intent applied in 
cases involving black defendants and white women, the white letter law 
has compounded the problem by also applying something akin to 
presumptive non-consent.
185
 The white letter law assumed that white 
 
 
 179. See, e.g., Lisa A. Crooms, Speaking Partial Truths and Preserving Power: Deconstructing 
White Supremacy, Patriarchy, and the Rape Corroboration Rule in the Interest of Black Liberation, 40 
HOW. L.J. 459 (1997); N. Jeremi Duru, The Central Park Five, the Scottsboro Boys, and the Myth of 
the Bestial Black Man, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1315, 1345 (2004) (exploring the association of black 
men as sexual predators); Gruber, supra note 40, at 587 (observing that during the late-nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, ―the law of rape incorporated the paradigm of a pathological stranger, 
prototypically a black man, lurking in the shadows, ready to violently assault the presumed-chaste 
(white) woman‖); Roberts, supra note 79, at 365 (1993) (noting the ―image of Black men as a constant 
threat to the virtue of white womanhood‖). 
 180. Perhaps the most famous example of this is the treatment of Emmett Till, the black fifteen-
year-old who was lynched in Mississippi for looking and whistling at a white woman. For more on the 
murder of Emmett Till, see STEVEN J. WHITFIELD, DEATH IN THE DELTA: THE STORY OF EMMETT 
TILL (1988). 
 181. 63 So. 2d at 389. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Deadlock in Yanceyville, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 26, 1951, at 25–26. 
 184. For a discussion of this case, see CONRAD LYNN, THERE IS A FOUNTAIN: AUTOBIOGRAPHY 
OF A CIVIL RIGHTS LAWYER 141, 145 (1979).  
 185. The one exception was where there was evidence to suggest that the white woman had 
previously been intimate, sexually or socially, with a black man, in which case consent was presumed. 
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women, because of their whiteness, would be repulsed by any such 
advances, rendering non-consent a given.
186
 Consider the argument made 
by a prosecutor in State v. Miller,
187
 in response to the defendants‘ 
assertions that the complainant had consented to sex. The prosecutor 
argued to the jury: 
[I]f [consent] was the case [the complainant] could not come into 
this courtroom and relate the story that she has . . . to you good 
people, because I argue to you that the average white woman abhors 
anything of this type in nature that had to do with a black man. It is 
innate within us . . . .
188
 
It took a federal court to vacate the conviction on the grounds of 
prosecutorial misconduct.
189
 This history matters. 
C. Race and Mens Rea: Credibility Determinations 
The presence or absence of consent has always turned on credibility, 
and here, too, history matters. As feminists have been quick to point out, 
the law of rape has been rife with distrust of women, ―assuming that 
women lie about their lack of consent for various reasons: to blackmail 
men, to explain the discovery of a consensual affair, or because of 
psychological illness.‖190 English Lord Chief Justice Matthew Hale 
warned that rape is a charge ―easily to be made,‖191 casting suspicion on 
all rape claims and prompting a norm of cautionary instructions to 
juries.
192
 John Henry Wigmore believed that no judge should let a rape 
 
 
For example, in State v. Vaughn, 431 So. 2d 358 (La. 1982), the Louisiana Supreme Court, on 
rehearing, reversed a rape conviction of two black defendants where the trial court had excluded 
evidence that the prosecutrix‘s brother-in-law was black, which she had denied, finding that such 
evidence was relevant to consent. Id. at 368–71. 
 186. During the infamous Scottsboro Boys case, when it was revealed that Victoria Price, one of 
the alleged rape victims, was a prostitute and that her story was filled with contradictions, one 
spectator pointed out, she ―might be a fallen woman, but by God she is a white woman.‖ See CARTER, 
supra note 81, at 295. 
 187. 220 S.E.2d 326 (N.C. 1975). 
 188. Id. at 337. 
 189. Miller v. North Carolina, 583 F.2d 701 (4th Cir. 1978). In reversing, the Fourth Circuit held 
that the prosecutor‘s summation, ―by deliberately injecting the issue of race into [the trial] so infected 
the trial with unfairness as to deny [the defendants] due process of law.‖ Id. at 703. Interestingly, the 
Supreme Court of North Carolina had found no error in the convictions. Miller, 220 S.E.2d at 340. 
 190. Cynthia Ann Wicktom, Note, Focusing on the Offender’s Forceful Conduct: A Proposal for 
the Redefinition of Rape Laws, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 399, 403 (1988). 
 191. HALE, supra note 46, at *635. 
 192. At one time, as many as half the states gave cautionary instructions at the end of rape trials, 
advising jurors to view the allegations of the prosecutrix with special caution. See generally A. 
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charge go to the jury ―unless the female complainant‘s social history and 
mental makeup have been examined and testified to by a qualified 
physician.‖193 A Yale Law Journal Note opined, ―[A] woman‘s need for 
sexual satisfaction may lead to the unconscious desire for forceful 
penetration, the coercion serving neatly to avoid the guilt feeling which 
might arise after willing participation.‖194 Many jurisdictions originally 
required corroboration to sustain a rape conviction.
195
 And a victim‘s 
sexual history was treated as relevant to her veracity.
196
  
This distrust of women continues to pervade rape prosecutions, though 
it is less explicit these days. It explains why cops and prosecutors continue 
to decline to prosecute many acquaintance rape cases, to say nothing of 
marital rape cases.
197
 It explains why, when professional basketball player 
Kobe Bryant was accused of rape, a tabloid newspaper had no qualms 
about running a prom photo of his accuser, raising her prom dress to 
reveal a garter belt, with the following headline: ―Kobe‘s Accuser: Did 
She Really Say No?‖198  
But there is another history of distrust that is equally important: the 
distrust of testimony by black men. At one point or another, nearly all of 
the Southern states, and several of the Northern states, prohibited blacks 
(and often other minorities as well) from testifying against whites.
199
 
Louisiana was an exception, of a sort. Rather than having an outright bar, 
Louisiana allowed free blacks to testify with the understanding that race, 
 
 
Thomas Morris, Note, The Empirical, Historical, and Legal Case Against the Cautionary Instruction: 
A Call for Legislative Reform, 1988 DUKE L.J. 154, 156. 
 193. 3A JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 924a (Little, Brown & 
Co. 1970) (1904). 
 194. Note, Forcible and Statutory Rape: An Exploration of the Operation and Objectives of the 
Consent Standard, 62 YALE L.J. 55, 67–68 (1952) (citations omitted). 
 195. See generally Note, The Rape Corroboration Requirement: Repeal Not Reform, 81 YALE L.J. 
1365 (1972). 
 196. See, e.g., State v. Sibley, 33 S.W. 167, 171 (Mo. 1895); see also Julia Simon-Kerr, Note, 
Unchaste and Incredible: The Use of Gendered Conceptions of Honor in Impeachment, 117 YALE L.J. 
1854 (2008). 
 197. For studies on the attrition rate for various types of rapes, see David P. Bryden & Sonja 
Lengnick, Rape in the Criminal Justice System, 87 J. CRIM. & CRIMINOLOGY 1194 (1997); see also 
LINDA A. FAIRSTEIN, SEXUAL VIOLENCE: OUR WAR AGAINST RAPE 151–52 (1993); Lisa Frohmann, 
Discrediting Victims’ Allegations of Sexual Assault: Prosecutorial Accounts of Case Rejections, 38 
SOC. PROBS. 213, 217–24 (1991). 
 198. Kobe’s Accuser: Did She Really Say No?, THE GLOBE, Nov. 31, 2003, at 1; see also Rebecca 
Traister, Did Bonnie Fuller Really Betray Women?: Female Editors Condemn the Globe for Running a 
Tawdry Photograph of Kobe Bryant’s Accuser, SALON, Oct. 31, 2003, http://dir.salon.com/mwt/ 
feature/2003/10/31/kobe/index.html. 
 199. MORRIS, supra note 56, at 239–48; Paul Finkelman, Prelude to the Fourteenth Amendment: 
Black Legal Rights in the Antebellum North, 17 RUTGERS L.J. 415 (1986); Sheri Lynn Johnson, The 
Color of Truth: Race and the Assessment of Credibility, 1 MICH. J. RACE & L. 261 (1996). 
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depending upon ―the circumstances,‖ may ―diminish the extent of [their] 
credibility.‖200 In part, these rules can be attributed to the perceived 
unseemliness of having blacks testify against whites. The Ohio Supreme 
Court put it this way: 
No matter how pure the character, yet, if the color is not right, the 
man can not testify. The truth shall not be received from a black 
man, to settle a controversy where a white man is a party. Let a man 
be Christian or infidel . . . let him be of good character or bad; even 
let him be sunk to the lowest depths of degradation; he may be a 
witness in our courts if he is not black.
201
 
But these rules also reflected a general distrust of the veracity of 
blacks. In short, courts deemed blacks inherently unreliable. The sentiment 
expressed by one slaveholder is likely representative: ―Do you bring your 
negroe to contradict me! A negroe and a passionate woman are equal as to 
truth or falsehood; for neither thinks of what they say.‖202 Or as one legal 
commentator warned, ―the negro, as a general rule, is mendacious.‖203 
It was only after the Civil War, when the Freedmen‘s Courts refused to 
surrender jurisdiction to state courts until race-based competency rules 
were removed, that states permitted blacks to testify in some cases.
204
 
Even still, some courts allowed blackness to be used as a basis for 
impeachment. North Carolina permitted blacks to testify but required that 
―whenever a person of color shall be examined as a witness, the court shall 
warn the witness to declare the truth.‖205 Elsewhere, prosecutors argued of 
black witnesses, ―You must deal with a negro in the light of the fact he is a 
negro, and applying your experience and common sense.‖206 And well into 
the twentieth century, prosecutors still appealed to race as a basis for 
discrediting testimony.
207
 
 
 
 200. George Fisher, The Jury’s Rise as Lie Detector, 107 YALE L.J. 575, 671 n.451 (1997) (citing 
LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 2261 (1857)). 
 201. Jordan v. Smith, 14 Ohio 199, 201 (1846). 
 202. 2 THE DIARY OF COLONEL LANDON CARTER OF SABINE HALL, 1752–1778, at 1107 (Jack P. 
Greene ed., 1965). 
 203. 1 THOMAS R. R. COBB, AN INQUIRY INTO THE LAW OF NEGRO SLAVERY IN THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA 233 (1858). 
 204. See Fisher, supra note 200, at 667–76. 
 205. Id. at 685. 
 206. Simmons v. State, 71 So. 979 (Ala. Ct. App. 1916) (reversing conviction on the ground of 
prosecutorial misconduct). 
 207. See Johnson, supra note 199 (discussing cases involving prosecutorial appeals to race). There 
are also recent examples of appeals to race. See, e.g., Moore v. Morton, 255 F.3d 95, 99–100 (3d Cir. 
2001) (finding defendant in rape case was denied a fair trial where prosecutor argued that jury could 
infer that black defendant, who had white wife, selected the victim because she was white); State v. 
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Although black letter law biases may no longer be with us, these biases 
do linger in the white letter law. Lawyers may no longer explicitly use race 
to impeach; courts may no longer give racially inflected cautionary 
instructions. But excising the word is not the same as excising the 
sentiment. As social-science literature makes clear, race is still a factor in 
credibility determinations.
208
 These credibility determinations have 
consequences.  
Consider People v. Williams,
209
 in which the California Supreme Court 
held that Wash Jones Williams was not entitled to an instruction on 
reasonable mistake regarding consent.
210
 Williams, a fifty-two-year-old 
volunteer and resident at a homeless shelter, testified that ―Deborah,‖ 
another resident, had initiated sexual contact by hugging and kissing him 
and removing her clothes, that she had fondled him to overcome his 
impotence, and that she had inserted his penis inside her.
211
 In stark 
contrast, Deborah testified that she was forcibly raped.
212
 The jury agreed 
with Deborah and convicted the defendant, but the defendant appealed on 
the ground that the trial court had erred in refusing to instruct the jury on 
his honest and reasonable belief defense.
213
 Notwithstanding the fact that 
the California Supreme Court had previously allowed a reasonable mistake 
defense in People v. Mayberry,
214
 in this instance, it sided with the trial 
judge. Finding that there was not ―substantial evidence of equivocal 
conduct‖ on Deborah‘s part,215 the court ruled that Williams was not 
entitled to a reasonable and honest belief instruction and affirmed the 
conviction.
216
  
At first blush, the court‘s decision barring Williams from even raising a 
reasonable mistake defense might seem odd, or at least at odds with the 
 
 
Rogan, 984 P.2d 1231, 1238–40 (Haw. 1999) (finding denial of fair trial where prosecutor argued in 
closing that it is ―every mother‘s nightmare‖ to find ―some black, military guy on top of your 
daughter‖); Reynolds v. State, 580 So.2d 254, 255–57 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (reversing conviction 
on fundamental fairness grounds where prosecutor repeatedly and gratuitously injected race into case 
involving black defendant and white victim). 
 208. See, e.g., James W. Neuliep et al., The Influence of Ethnocentrism in Organizational 
Contexts: Perceptions of Interviewee and Managerial Attractiveness, Credibility, and Effectiveness, 53 
COMMUNICATION Q. 41 (2005); see also Chet K.W. Pager, Blind Justice, Colored Truths and the Veil 
of Ignorance, 41 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 373 (2005); Joseph W. Rand, The Demeanor Gap: Race, Lie 
Detection, and the Jury, 33 CONN. L. REV. 1 (2000). 
 209. 841 P.2d 961 (Cal. 1992). 
 210. Id. at 966. 
 211. Id. at 964. 
 212. Id. at 962–63. 
 213. Id. at 962, 964. 
 214. 542 P.2d 1337, 1340 (Cal. 1975).  
 215. Williams, 841 P.2d. at 966. 
 216. Id.  
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court‘s prior decision in Mayberry. To accept the Williams decision is to 
accept the court‘s claim that Williams could not both believe that Deborah 
had consented, and claim that he honestly and reasonably believed that 
Deborah consented.
217
 To accept the Williams decision is also to discount 
Williams‘s testimony, since objectively his testimony, if credited, supports 
both a finding of consent and a finding that he reasonably and honestly 
believed that consent was present.  
But there is another way to read the case that does suggest coherency, 
if not logic.
218
 Wash Jones Williams was black.
219
 Deborah was white.
220
 
A white woman‘s allegation of rape may still be open to question. But 
perhaps not as much as a black man‘s claim that she consented, or the 
reasonableness of his belief that she consented. Martha Chamallas has 
argued that in the battle of ―he said/she said,‖ the competing versions ―are 
structured predictably along gender lines.‖221 They are also structured 
along race lines. 
In recent years, feminist scholars have pressed for rape laws that 
eliminate the element of force entirely, that turn only on the issue of 
consent.
222
 In short, they have pressed for rape laws that turn largely on 
whether the complainant said ―no.‖223 As such, rape law reforms in recent 
years reflect not so much an evolution as a deliberate feminist strategy to 
shift the balance of power in rape prosecutions, giving more power to 
women vis-à-vis men in general. This strategy is not necessarily wrong. It 
may indeed level the playing field, at least in cases involving white 
 
 
 217. For a critique of the Williams court‘s approach to the mistake defense, see Rosanna 
Cavallaro, A Big Mistake: Eroding the Defense of Mistake of Fact About Consent in Rape, 86 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 815, 838–40 (1996). 
 218. As I have written elsewhere, part of what motivates me as a scholar is ―my awareness that, to 
a certain extent, I have always read judicial opinions ‗differently,‘ attuned to matters of race even in 
the face of efforts to excise race—to render race invisible, immaterial.‖ I. Bennett Capers, Reading 
Back, Reading Black, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 9, 11 (2006). This way of reading, I argued, is part and 
parcel of much critical race scholarship. See id. 
 219. According to Williams, the prosecutrix called him a ―welching Nigger‖ when he refused to 
pay her after sex. Williams, 841 P.2d at 964. 
 220. Id. The opinion further hints at Deborah‘s race by noting that she was from Wichita, Kansas. 
Id. at 962. 
 221. CHAMALLAS, supra note 112, at 229. 
 222. Some scholars take this a step further, arguing for a standard of ―communicative sexuality.‖ 
See, e.g., Lois Pineau, Date Rape: A Feminist Analysis, 8 L. & PHIL. 217, 233–37 (1989); Stephen J. 
Schulhofer, Taking Sexual Autonomy Seriously: Rape Law and Beyond, 11 L. & PHIL. 35, 77 (1992). 
 223. See BROWNMILLER, supra note 119, at 8 (1975) (―A female definition of rape can be 
contained in a single sentence. If a woman chooses not to have intercourse with a specific man and the 
man chooses to proceed against her will, that is a criminal act of rape.‖); FORELL & MATHEWS, supra 
note 131, at 223 (arguing for a standard in which ―sexual penetration without a woman‘s consent is 
rape‖); Lucy Reed Harris, Towards a Consent Standard in the Law of Rape, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 613 
(1976). 
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intraracial rape. The problem lies in the prototypical case that even 
feminists must acknowledge is more likely to be taken seriously by law 
enforcement officers, more likely to be prosecuted by district attorneys, 
more likely to receive guilty verdicts, and more likely to receive 
disproportionately harsh sentences: not the typical, intraracial rape, but the 
atypical interracial rape involving a white complainant and a black 
defendant.
224
 And given our history of not crediting black witnesses, this 
―he said/she said‖ contest is unlikely to be a level contest at all.  
Aya Gruber has recently argued that feminists‘ reforms have, perhaps 
unintentionally, resulted in the strengthening of the penal state and in 
increased incarceration without any concomitant benefit to women.
225
 As 
such, she argues that feminists would do well to reassess their continued 
involvement in rape reform.
226
 I join her in her call for reassessment, and 
offer an additional reason: in attempting to eradicate sexism, feminists 
have entrenched racism. The strategy for rape reform may be a noble one, 
but it is also a flawed one. 
III. MCQUIRTER V. STATE REVISITED 
A. Revisiting the Case 
Understanding how the white letter law of rape informs the application 
of the black letter law of rape contributes to a better understanding of 
McQuirter v. State.
227
 This white letter law adjusts the black letter law‘s 
presumptions, effects subtle shifts in its burdens of proof and persuasion, 
suggests whose story should be credited, and affects the finding of 
criminal intent and the absence of reasonable belief in consent. In short, 
this white letter law adds a racial thumb to the scales of justice that 
determine guilt or innocence, punishment, and, notwithstanding Coker v. 
Georgia,
228
 life or death. All of this helps me understand why I find 
McQuirter so troubling. 
Arrested and charged with attempting to commit an assault with intent 
to rape, McQuirter called character witnesses to testify to his good 
 
 
 224. It is estimated that sixty to eighty percent of rapes do not fit the prototypical rape case. See 
Lani Anne Remick, Read Her Lips: An Argument for a Verbal Consent Standard in Rape, 141 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1103, 1104 (1993). 
 225. Gruber, supra note 40, at 582–84. 
 226. Id. at 585. 
 227. 63 So. 2d 385 (Ala. Ct. App. 1953) 
 228. 433 U.S. 584 (1977). 
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character and took the stand in his own defense.
229
 He explained that he 
and a friend had been working in Pensacola, and that they had stopped for 
a break in Atmore on their way back to Monroeville.
230
 The two had split 
up, the friend going to the ―colored section‖ of town, and later McQuirter 
decided to follow him.
231
 After McQuirter started up the street, he saw the 
complainant and her children, and decided to wait until they had gone.
232
 
He then continued to walk toward the colored section, though he hesitated 
at the intersection to reconsider.
233
 After thinking about it for a few 
minutes, he resumed walking toward the colored section. This was his sole 
interaction with the complainant.
234
 Taking McQuirter at his word, each of 
his actions was constrained to avoid the appearance of being a threat. 
If we credit McQuirter‘s testimony, his conviction on the charge of 
attempt to commit assault with intent to rape seems unjust. But this is not 
necessarily a case of ―he said/she said,‖ compelling radically different 
outcomes. Even were we to credit the prosecutrix‘s testimony, we could 
reach the same conclusion. Recall that Mrs. Ted Allen testified that as she 
and her children passed the cab of McQuirter‘s truck, she heard McQuirter 
say something unintelligible, and that McQuirter then opened the cab door 
and placed his foot on the running board.
235
 She also testified that as she 
walked down the street, McQuirter was walking behind her, leading her to 
think that he was following her.
236
 She and the children turned into a 
friend‘s house and waited ten minutes for him to pass.237 But when she 
proceeded again, she observed McQuirter coming toward her from behind 
a telephone pole.
238
 When a neighbor approached, McQuirter turned and 
went back to the intersection ―across the street from Mrs. Allen‘s home,‖ 
where he stayed for about thirty minutes before moving on.
239
 This was 
her sole interaction with the defendant. Taking Mrs. Ted Allen at her 
word, she honestly perceived McQuirter to be a sexual threat. 
This is not a case where the testimony of the accuser and accused are 
wholly divergent or irreconcilable. It is a case where one could accept that 
 
 
 229. 63 So. 2d at 389. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. 
 234. McQuirter v. State, 63 So. 2d 380, 389 (Ala. Ct. App. 1953). For a more thorough discussion 
of the facts, see supra notes 1–7 and accompanying text. 
 235. 63 So. 2d at 389. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id.  
 238. Id.   
 239. Id. 
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the accuser genuinely believed that the accused intended to rape her, and 
yet conclude that the accused lacked any such intent. In short, that he was 
an unintentional rapist. Critical of the legal prerequisites to rape, Catherine 
MacKinnon has argued that there may be situations where a ―woman is 
raped but not by a rapist.‖240 What I am suggesting here is a slightly 
different situation, where there is neither a rape nor a rapist. 
One could imagine that when she passed McQuirter‘s cab and heard 
the appellant say something unintelligible, his intent was not to address 
her; that instead he was mumbling to himself, deciding whether to follow 
his friend to the colored section. One could imagine that when he placed 
his foot on the running board and began walking in the same direction that 
Mrs. Allen was walking, it was not with the intent to follow her, but with 
the intent to walk to the colored section. One could imagine that when she 
turned into a friend‘s house to wait for him to pass, it was McQuirter‘s 
intent, given the mores of the time, to do the same—to ―wait[] until he 
decided they were gone.‖241 One could imagine that when she proceeded 
again and saw McQuirter approaching, it was not because he intended to 
assault her or even accost her, but because he had assumed that ―they were 
gone.‖ And one could imagine that when she observed McQuirter 
lingering at the intersection across the street from her home, he was not 
lying in wait for her to come home—being from out of town, could he 
have even known he was standing in front of her home?—but having 
second thoughts about whether to proceed to the colored section of town. 
One could credit both McQuirter‘s testimony and Mrs. Ted Allen‘s 
testimony and reach this conclusion. Or one could simply credit Mrs. Ted 
Allen‘s testimony. That is what McQuirter‘s jury decided to do. 
But McQuirter‘s jury did more than this. The jury also found that each 
of the elements of the black letter law of rape was satisfied.
242
 To find 
McQuirter guilty of ―attempt to commit an assault with intent to commit 
rape,‖ the jury presumably had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that 
McQuirter committed an act sufficient to constitute the actus reus of 
 
 
 240. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist 
Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635, 654 (1983). 
 241. 63 So. 2d at 389. 
 242. To find the defendant guilty, the jury was necessarily required to find that the prosecutor had 
proved each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 
(1970) (holding that the Due Process Clause requires the prosecutor to persuade the factfinder beyond 
a reasonable doubt of ―every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged‖). Whether the jury in fact 
made these findings, or was charged as such, is anyone‘s guess. McQuirter did not appeal the jury 
instructions. What is clear is that general principles of the law of criminal attempt would require such 
findings. See generally DRESSLER, supra note 8, at 417–21. 
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attempt and that McQuirter possessed the requisite mens rea, in this case a 
series of intents: he intended to commit the act constituting the actus reus 
of attempt—in other words, some act bringing him in proximity of the 
offense of assault; he committed this act with the specific intention of 
committing assault; and that he also had the specific intent to commit 
assault with the specific intent to commit rape. Specifically, he intended to 
have sex with Mrs. Ted Allen; intended to secure sex by use of force or 
threat of force; and intended to secure sex without Mrs. Allen‘s consent, or 
was at least indifferent to consent. Presumably, the jury was also required 
to find that Mrs. Ted Allen would have resisted to the utmost. Even 
crediting Mrs. Ted Allen‘s testimony, finding that McQuirter had the 
requisite mens rea necessary for a verdict of guilty should have been 
difficult. It was not—not to the jury, and not to the court that reviewed and 
affirmed McQuirter‘s conviction on appeal. It was not difficult because the 
white letter law made it easy.  
The white letter law allowed the jurors to presume the veracity of Mrs. 
Ted Allen‘s testimony and to presume the falsity of McQuirter‘s 
testimony. The white letter law allowed the jury to presume that Mrs. 
Allen‘s apprehensiveness was reasonable; that, if propositioned, she would 
not have consented; that she would have resisted any attack ―in every way 
possible . . . until she was overcome by force, was insensible through 
fright, or ceased resistance from exhaustion, fear of death or great bodily 
harm.‖243 The white letter law allowed the jurors to presume that 
McQuirter intentionally followed Mrs. Allen, or intentionally lay in wait 
for her, with the intent to engage in forcible sex with Mrs. Ted Allen 
without her consent. In short, the white letter law allowed the jury to use 
blackness as a substitute for intent, and to use the dyad of black male 
defendant and white female accuser as a substitute for the absence of 
consent. When all was said and done, the white letter law may not have 
entirely relieved the prosecution of its burden of proof, but it certainly 
rendered its burden much lighter.  
Still, the argument might be made that McQuirter is purely historical. 
The presumptions and subtle shifts in burdens and other shadings that 
allowed McQuirter‘s conviction are things of the past. But, of course, race 
still matters. It is why the Supreme Court has made clear that failure to 
permit the defense to inquire during voir dire about racial prejudice in 
cases involving interracial crime is reversible error.
244
 It is why states such 
 
 
 243. King v. State, 357 S.W.2d 42, 45 (Tenn. 1962). 
 244. Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 38–39 (1986). 
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as Massachusetts and Pennsylvania continue to have particular rules about 
voir dire in cases alleging interracial rape.
245
 It is why in Mississippi, of all 
places, there is a presumption that a defendant is unable to receive a fair 
trial, thus warranting the granting of a change of venue motion, in cases 
where the crime was ―committed by a black defendant upon a white 
victim.‖246 
When I first read McQuirter, what troubled me as much as McQuirter‘s 
conviction was the appellate court‘s ruling that, ―In determining the 
question of intention the jury may consider social conditions and customs 
founded upon racial differences, such as that the prosecutrix was a white 
woman and the defendant was a negro man.‖247 Now, when I read 
McQuirter, I appreciate the court‘s honesty. It helps that the white letter 
law is not always invisible. Sometimes, if only for a brief moment, as if 
written on a tabula rasa or an Etch-a-Sketch, it is there in black and white. 
I appreciate the court‘s honesty, though faced with the court‘s instruction, 
I might have applied the instruction differently. The court suggested that 
McQuirter‘s intent was inferable from racial mores. But would not the 
mores of the time have supported a finding of the absence of intent? Is it 
really likely that McQuirter, alone in the white part of town in Alabama in 
1951, and observing Mrs. Ted Allen walking along a residential street with 
two children, intended to assault her, let alone rape her? With neighbors 
on either side of the street? With Suell Lufkin‘s house right there and with 
Mr. Simmons watching him?
248
 With Mrs. Allen watching him from Mrs. 
Simmons‘s porch?249 In the state known for the Scottsboro Boys case, that 
had a history of lynching black men, and where two black men had been 
lynched just the year before?
250
 But then again, maybe the jury applied 
different mores. Or perhaps the ―social conditions and customs‖ that 
allowed the jury to infer guilt trumped the ―social conditions and customs‖ 
that suggested the absence of intent. 
 
 
 245. Commonwealth v. Glaspy, 616 A.2d 1359, 1362 (Pa. 1992) (holding that defendants were 
entitled to voir dire prospective jurors about racial prejudice in cases alleging interracial rape); 
Commonwealth v. Sanders, 421 N.E.2d 436 (Mass. 1981) (same).  
 246. Barfield v. State, 22 So. 3d. 1175, 1183 (Miss. 2009) (citing White v. State, 495 So. 2d 1346, 
1349 (Miss. 1986)); see also Gray v. Epps, No. 4:04CV234LG, 2008 WL 4793796 (S.D. Miss. Oct. 
27, 2008). 
 247. McQuirter v. State, 63 So. 2d 388, 390 (Ala. Ct. App. 1953). 
 248. Id. at 389. 
 249. Id. 
 250. For a list of the approximately 2400 African Americans who were lynched between 1865 and 
1965, see The Lynching Calendar, http://www.autopsis.org/foot/lynch.html (last visited May 12, 
2010). 
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B. Rethinking Feminist Reforms 
Catharine MacKinnon has provocatively argued that rape laws are but 
another mechanism for sustaining male dominance over women.
251
 But 
even this looks at the law too myopically. In fact, the criminal law has 
always been about the maintenance of power, whether that power lies in 
privileges associated with gender, race, class, or some other status.
252
 Rape 
laws may further the interest of men to the detriment of women, but they 
also reflect broader notions of power.  
The rape laws in this country, whatever the black letter law may have 
said or may say, have always been obsessed with certain types of rapists 
(strangers and black men) and certain types of rape victims (white, pure, 
demure, chaste, and of the right class).
253
 Indeed, there are parallels 
between rape law‘s obsession with strangers and black men. It is quite 
possible that the concern with stranger rape was predicated on a concern 
for interclass rape. As with interracial rape, which was concerned 
primarily with the rape of white women by nonwhites, interclass rape was 
also unidirectional—concerned primarily with the rape of the not-poor by 
the poor.
254
 This perhaps explains why the law developed in such a way to 
facilitate interclass and interracial rape prosecutions. This perhaps explains 
why the law, for the longest time, was indifferent to marital rape and to 
acquaintance rape, both assumed to be intraclass and intraracial. 
Again, there are parallels between the fear of interclass rape and 
interracial rape. But interracial rape is the type of rape that has been most 
feared.
255
 MacKinnon speaks of rape as sustaining male dominance over 
 
 
 251. MacKinnon, supra note 240, at 644.  
 252. For an overview of this relationship between criminal laws and control, see generally DAVID 
GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY: A STUDY IN SOCIAL THEORY (1990). 
 253. Dorothy Roberts makes a similar observation: 
 American society has always defined rape in terms of race. Race is not a peculiar aspect 
of rape; race helps to determine what rape means. The racialized history of rape does not 
diminish rape‘s roots in ordinary heterosexual relations; in America, rape‘s racial and sexual 
origins are inseparably intertwined. . . . The image of the violent man, who is the rapist, and 
who is therefore the target of the law, is a Black man. 
Roberts, supra note 79, at 364–65. 
 254. As Joanna Bourke has observed, well into the beginning of the twentieth century, it was often 
assumed that women of the working classes were more familiar with sex, more capable of defending 
themselves, and thus unrape-able; it was therefore often assumed that ―any women from the lower 
classes who dared claim to have been assaulted was patently lying.‖ JOANNA BOURKE, RAPE: SEX, 
VIOLENCE, HISTORY 27 (2007). Similarly, working-class men were viewed as naturally prone to rape. 
Even Clarence Darrow, the renowned trial attorney, espoused this view, stating that rape was ―almost 
always the crime of the poor, the hardworking, the uneducated and the abnormal.‖ CLARENCE SEWARD 
DARROW, CRIME: ITS CAUSES AND TREATMENT 88 (1922). 
 255. See supra note 178. 
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women. But this ignores at least four things. First, our rape laws—at least 
as applied—have not operated to regulate the autonomy of ―women,‖ but 
rather only certain types of women.
256
 Second, our rape laws—at least as 
applied and informed by the white letter law—have also operated to 
regulate the autonomy of black men.
257
 Black men are given 
unconscionable latitude when it comes to access to black women, and a 
leash when it comes to access to white women.  
Third, our rape laws, though color-neutral, have always operated in 
tandem with other laws to entrench power in ways that are color-coded. At 
first, these rape laws operated in tandem with black letter laws (such as 
laws criminalizing interracial marriage or cohabitation) to make certain 
rapes easier to prosecute and to police the autonomy of white women and 
black men. In Loving v. Virginia,
258
 the Supreme Court invalidated 
Virginia‘s anti-miscegenation statute because its focus on regulating 
―marriage involving white persons‖ made it clear that the measure was 
―designed to maintain White Supremacy.‖259 What the Court missed, and 
what MacKinnon misses, is that rape laws operated in tandem with these 
laws. Rape laws were also ―designed to maintain White Supremacy.‖ And, 
to a certain extent, now with the help of white letter law, they still are. 
How else are we to understand the uproar surrounding the rape of the 
Central Park jogger, and the corresponding lack of uproar regarding the 
many black women that were brutalized and raped that year?
260
 
But the most important thing, what MacKinnon and Estrich and, 
indeed, the vast majority of feminist legal scholars miss, is this: the 
acquiescence of women in maintaining this system of laws. Susan Estrich 
has observed that women have difficulty recognizing simple rape—where 
the perpetrator is an acquaintance and where no weapon was used—as real 
rape, whereas they all recognize sex with a stranger as rape.
261
 What 
Estrich left unsaid is the extent to which white women recognize that 
forcible, nonconsensual sex with black men is rape. This is what society 
teaches them.
262
 But it is also what they participate in maintaining. The 
 
 
 256. FORELL & MATTHEWS, supra note 131, at 229 (describing certain types of women, such as 
prostitutes and black women, as ―unrapeable‖). 
 257. Gruber, supra note 40, at 587 (observing that rape law was part of the larger state effort to 
enforce white racial supremacy); Ristroph, supra note 17, at 179 (observing that rape law was used to 
enforce gender and racial hierarchies). 
 258. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 259. Id. at 11. 
 260. See supra notes 118–20 and accompanying text. 
 261. ESTRICH, supra note 20, at 13–14. 
 262. See CHAMALLAS, supra note 112, at 225 (observing that ―the prototypical rape evokes an 
implicit racialized image‖). 
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fact is that women have never been innocent bystanders in first 
determining what is rape, and then reporting it as such. No rape case 
discussed in this Article could have existed without a woman at its center 
as the prosecutrix.
263
 By participating in the prosecution of interracial rape 
cases while allowing intraracial rape cases to be taken less seriously, 
indeed swept to the side, women—especially white women—have in fact 
added legitimacy to the notion that some rapes are ―real rapes,‖ and other 
rapes are not. That is, when a white woman has forcible, nonconsensual 
sex with a white man, especially if the white man is someone she knows, 
then it is less egregious; it is not rape. It may be Scarlett O‘Hara and Rhett 
Butler, but it is not rape, at least not real rape. If the substantive goal is to 
prohibit and punish all forcible sex, or even all nonconsensual sex, women 
have undermined that goal by willingly participating in a system that in 
fact only prohibits and punishes nonconsensual sex in certain cases, a 
system that is underinclusive. I am not suggesting women have done this 
intentionally. In fact, I assume just the opposite. 
The consequences of this underreporting are many. Perhaps most 
troubling, by failing to recognize and report all rapes as rape, white 
women have unintentionally skewed the racial demographics of reported 
rapists, and in effect legitimized and reinforced racial stereotypes that 
prefigure black men as hypersexual and aggressive, and white women as 
racially vulnerable. In addition, by underreporting white-assailant rape, 
white women unintentionally participate in promoting and giving valence 
to the very ―rape script,‖264 to borrow from Sharon Marcus‘s term, that 
renders inconsequential and invisible the frequency of intraracial rape 
while simultaneously undervaluing the harm resulting from such rapes.
265
 
Lastly, by engaging in reporting that is not just racially skewed but also 
interracially skewed, white women unintentionally reproduce white 
 
 
 263. These cases, of course, are just a fraction of the rape cases reported. But the cases reported 
are just a fraction of all rapes. The fact is that women are far more likely to report rapes perpetrated by 
strangers—perceived to be real rapes—than rapes by acquaintances. And when it comes to white 
women, it appears that white women are more likely to report rapes when their assailants are non-
white than when their assailants are white. Part of this may be attributable to believability. Because the 
credibility of rape victims is often put in question, rape victims are more likely to report rapes where 
their credibility will be least doubted. In these circumstances, women report rapes that society will 
accept as real rapes, i.e., rapes involving strangers or black men. 
 264. See Sharon Marcus, Fighting Bodies, Fighting Words: A Theory and Politics of Rape 
Prevention, in FEMINISTS THEORIZE THE POLITICAL 385, 389–95 (Judith Butler & Joan W. Scott eds., 
1992). 
 265. Wriggins, supra note 54, at 124 (noting that ―the myth that rape is only a crime committed by 
Black men against white women has obscured and deflected attention from the varied nature, 
pervasiveness, and influence of the sexual subordination to which all women are subjected‖). 
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privilege (both their own and that of their white assailants) and reproduce 
imbalances of power along axes of race and gender. 
To be clear, my agenda here is not to lay all the blame at the feet of 
women. Women may have acquiesced in the application of the rules, but 
they did not write the rules, at least not initially. Men did. Nor is my goal 
to draw a battle line. Rather, my goal is to make visible a battle line that 
has long existed, and to begin the process of erasing it. The point is to 
forge alliances for a common goal of remaking the law of rape, and the 
law of not rape, so that it is fair to everyone. The first step to such a 
coalition, however, is honest dialogue, and honest reflection. We should 
all be prepared to ask ourselves tough questions. To that end, feminist 
scholars need to ask themselves, what would have happened, and what 
would happen, if women really said ―no‖; i.e., if women refused to testify 
or otherwise cooperate in any ―real rape‖ prosecution unless other rapes 
(intraracial rapes, acquaintance rapes, simple rapes, rapes involving 
victims of color) were prosecuted too? In short, if one goal of feminism 
has been to instill in women their right to say no, one goal of this Article is 
to encourage women to embrace a more important no. ―No‖ to prosecuting 
aggravated rape, but not date rape. ―No‖ to treating strangers as rapists, 
but not their acquaintances. And ―no‖ to treating black men as rapists, 
when the white letter law would not treat similarly situated white men as 
rapists. 
IV. RAPE HARMS, AND IMAGINING STATE V. ALLEN 
In the end, of course, it is impossible to definitively say whether 
McQuirter was innocent or guilty. Even the jury that convicted McQuirter 
may have had its doubts.
266
 But even assuming arguendo that McQuirter 
was in fact guilty—that he did have the intent to rape Mrs. Ted Allen—we 
should still find the case troubling. We should find the case troubling 
because the proof required to convict him—the proof purportedly required 
by the black letter law—was in fact a lesser standard of proof than that 
which would have been required had McQuirter been white. Mostly, 
though, we should find the case troubling because of the very real 
 
 
 266. The punishment they set for McQuirter was de minimis: the jury assessed a fine of $500. 
McQuirter v. State, 63 So. 2d 388, 388 (Ala. Ct. App. 1953). Of course, a fine of $500 in 1953 was 
likely the equivalent of sentencing McQuirter to hard labor, given the practice in many southern states 
of incarcerating defendants unable to pay fines. The Supreme Court finally declared this practice 
unconstitutional in 1971. See Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 400–01 (1971); see also Derek A. Westen, 
Comment, Fines, Imprisonment, and the Poor: ―Thirty Dollars or Thirty Days,‖ 57 CAL. L. REV. 778 
(1969). 
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likelihood that McQuirter was innocent. This is certainly the aspect that 
troubles me. It is the possibility that McQuirter, at worst, was an 
unintentional rapist. 
As a black man who, in 1950s Alabama, could easily have ended up in 
McQuirter‘s position, or who, in Susan Estrich‘s rape story, would be 
described by the police as ―a crow,‖ I find these issues more than 
academic. I began this Article by confiding that, to many, my blackness 
and maleness mark me as a threat to white women, as a potential rapist. In 
fact, I am one of the few men who, if ever charged with rape in such a 
case, would be tempted to assert a factual impossibility defense. I am not 
only black and male, but also decidedly gay. Nonetheless, my life is 
replete with encounters in which I have been cast as a rapist.
267
 It has not 
mattered that the vast majority of rapes are intraracial, acquaintance rapes. 
Because we have imagined the ―classic rape‖ as interracial, stranger rape, I 
have been cast as a rapist, or a potential rapist, or a rapist in waiting, time 
and again.
268
 These incidents are why, when I see a woman glancing 
apprehensively at me as she waits for an elevator, I find a way to wait for 
the next elevator. These incidents are why, in the predominantly white 
neighborhood where I live, I rarely take strolls in the evening alone. These 
incidents are why, even at the law firms where I once worked, I made sure 
not to work too late if there were just a few women on the floor.
269
 Devon 
Carbado and Mitu Gulati have written about the work that racial minorities 
 
 
 267. The first time was when I was still in college, during a study abroad program in London. I 
was walking to an evening class when I noticed one of my classmates just ahead of me. This 
classmate—I cannot remember her name, so let‘s call her Julie—had sat next to me just a few days 
earlier during orientation. We had talked. We had gotten along. So when I spotted her walking ahead 
of me, I called her name and when she glanced back, I waved. She didn‘t wave back, though. Instead, 
she quickened her pace. Then she started running. When I arrived at the university a few minutes later, 
she was in class, breathing hard. But I was the one that felt shaken. She looked at me, and I could tell 
she realized then that it had only been me behind her—her classmate, the nice black boy from America 
she‘d met a few days before. She looked relieved. I still felt shaken. Of course, we didn‘t speak about 
what had happened, what she had assumed. And I‘m sure she quickly forgot about the whole thing. I 
am the one who has not forgotten. In part, this is because I kept replaying the incident in my head, 
feeling shame each time, even though I knew I had done nothing to warrant her reaction. But I also 
cannot forget because I have experienced so many similar incidents since then. 
 268. Dorothy Roberts makes a similar observation in discussing women‘s fear of male strangers, 
noting that ―[w]omen‘s fear of strangers on the street is complicated by the deeply-embedded [sic] 
image of the dangerous Black man.‖ Roberts, supra note 79, at 378. 
 269. Frank Rudy Cooper discusses a similar dynamic. See Frank Rudy Cooper, Against Bipolar 
Black Masculinity: Intersectionality, Assimilation, Identity Performance, and Hierarchy, 39 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 853, 886–87 (2006). As may be evident, my concerns here are broader than the harm 
faced by men who are falsely accused of rape. Rather, I am including here men who have never been 
accused of rape, but who have readjusted their lives so that they appear non-threatening. It is this harm 
that concerns me the most. 
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do to provide ―racial comfort.‖270 But even this misses the work that many 
black men must do to instill sexual comfort. And it misses the stigmatic 
harm of repeatedly being raced and sexed as a rapist.  
For some years now, feminist scholars have argued that the real harm 
of rape is not only the harm caused by the physical violence, but the harm 
to their sense of self.
271
 Feminist scholars have described rape as a ―harm 
to the spirit,‖272 as a form of ―spiritual murder,‖273 and as ―soul-murder.‖274 
It is beyond dispute that this harm is real. But it should also be beyond 
dispute that there is a harm suffered by all men,
275
 particularly black men, 
perceived to be rapists. To be sure, the harms I am describing do not begin 
to compare to the physical and emotional harm of rape. In fact, they pale 
in comparison. But that does not mean these harms are not significant. 
They are. These harms do matter.  
In many respects, these harms parallel the harm that women 
experience. According to Susan Brownmiller, ―the rapist performs a 
myrmidon function for all men by keeping all women in a thrall of anxiety 
and fear.‖276 Susan Estrich has written, ―I don‘t think I know a single 
woman who does not live with some fear of being raped. A few of us—
more than a few, really—live with our own histories.‖277 And Margaret 
Gordon and Stephanie Riger have found empirical support for these 
assertions.
278
 One-third of the women they surveyed said they worry at 
least once a month about being raped, and that the fear of rape is ―always 
there.‖279 Many men,280 especially black men, experience parallel harms. 
Even a black woman I know has voiced a similar experience: hailing a 
white female friend one evening on a college campus, only to have the 
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white female friend glance back and, seeing a black figure, react with fear, 
fearing rape.  
Gordon and Riger also found that a third of the women they surveyed 
reported taking precautions to avoid rape.
281
 As another scholar put it, 
―women live their lives according to a rape schedule‖ that dictates when 
they go out, with whom they go out, and where they go.
282
 Many black 
men do the same, taking related precautions. Many live their lives 
according to a schedule that minimizes both the risk of being perceived as 
a rapist, and the consequences of such a perception. These concerns 
impact where many black men choose to live, how they interact with white 
women at work, and even the decision whether to go for an evening run.
283
  
Black men are harmed in other ways as well. Here, feminist theorist 
Ann Cahill‘s examination of the harm that rape does to women is useful. 
Rejecting as overly simplistic the observation that rape objectifies women, 
Cahill argues that rape is a form of ―derivatization.‖ Cahill defines the 
term as: 
―[T]reating the person as a derivative,‖ where the ethical principle 
being violated is not that persons are things (a principle that denies 
the materiality of human existence) but rather that persons should 
not be reduced to other person‘s desires, wishes, or projects. . . . To 
derivatize is to portray, render, understand, or approach a subject 
solely as the reflection, projection, or expression of another 
subject‘s being, desires, fears, etc.284 
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This concept of derivatization seems to apply with equal force when 
we consider the interactions that sometimes occur between white women 
and black men. In these interactions, where the black male is perceived as 
a sexual threat, it is the black male whose individuality and ontological 
autonomy is denied. It is the black male who becomes a projection of 
someone else‘s fears. It is the black man who is reduced not only to a 
raced and sexed body, but to a dangerous body as well. 
My awareness of these harms informs my reading of McQuirter and 
leads me to think again about his encounter with Mrs. Ted Allen. It 
prompts me to wonder who was in greater fear: Mrs. Ted Allen, 
surrounded by three children, on her own street securely on the white side 
of town, with Suell Lufkin‘s house nearby, with Mr. Simmons at her side 
eventually standing on Mrs. Simmons‘s porch, watching McQuirter ―for 
about thirty minutes‖?285 Or was it McQuirter, a black man alone on the 
white side of town in 1950s Alabama, knowing that when he saw a white 
woman it would be best if he ―turned around and waited until . . . they 
were gone‖?286 
Let me be absolutely clear. Even if McQuirter had never been arrested 
that day, he still experienced harm. He was harmed by a white letter law 
that constrained his movement, and that put him at great risk—no matter 
what precautions he took—of being perceived as a rapist. And he was 
harmed by Mrs. Ted Allen. 
If the task at hand is to rethink rape law, then what is required is to 
rethink not only what harm we seek to prevent by proscribing rape, but 
also to rethink why we seek to prevent some harms but not others. Part of 
the task is to ask who benefits and why. And part of the task is to then 
refashion the law so that there is not merely a shift in power, with white 
women gaining power vis-à-vis black men. Rather, the task is to refashion 
the law so that there is a more egalitarian and just distribution of power. 
And this leads me to ask the question that originally motivated this 
Article. What happens when we: (i) assume that McQuirter did not have 
the intent to rape Mrs. Ted Allen; (ii) assume that Mrs. Ted Allen, using 
race as a marker of intent, wrongly perceived McQuirter to have the intent 
to rape; (iii) that Mrs. Ted Allen, acting on this inaccurate belief, took 
evasive measures that included stopping at a friend‘s house, summoning 
Mr. Simmons to watch McQuirter, and watching McQuirter herself ―for 
about thirty minutes‖287 from Mr. Simmons‘s porch; and (iv) that Mrs. Ted 
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Allen‘s actions in fact put McQuirter in fear of imminent bodily injury or 
in fear of a wrongful arrest? Is it possible to recast McQuirter not as the 
defendant, but as a crime victim, with Mrs. Ted Allen cast as the 
perpetrator, causing a racially motivated harm? In short, is it possible to 
reframe McQuirter v. State into a hypothetical State v. Allen?  
The state‘s ―police power‖ has been described as ―the most essential of 
powers, at times the most insistent, and always one of the least limitable of 
the powers of government.‖288 It allows the state to criminalize whatever 
conduct it reasonably deems harmful to the public health, safety, welfare, 
or morals, so long as it does not prohibit some individual right guaranteed 
by the Constitution, and the criminalized conduct is rationally related to 
the harm sought to be avoided.
289
 Based on its broad police powers, a state 
could, if it chose to do so, reframe McQuirter v. State into a hypothetical 
State v. Allen. For example, a state could, invoking its broad police 
powers, make it a crime to unjustifiably or inexcusably inflict racially 
motivated harm. Under such a statute, a person who recklessly puts 
another person in fear of imminent bodily injury or wrongful arrest would 
be guilty of an offense if the basis for the person‘s conduct was motivated 
by race and was otherwise unjustified or inexcusable.  
But, already, it should be apparent that the gap between ―could‖ and 
―would‖ is a wide one. It should be apparent that whether the state could 
criminalize Mrs. Ted Allen‘s conduct, or for that matter Mr. Simmons‘s 
conduct as an aider and abettor, is not the real question. Nor is the real 
question whether the state is interested in creating such a law. Common 
sense tells us that it is not.  
The real question raised by this Article—through its foregrounding of 
the white letter law of rape and its impact on the black letter law of rape, 
through its re-imagining of McQuirter v. State, and through its concerns 
for the everyday lives of black men—is this: How do we get to a point 
where a white woman can walk alone at night, and a black man can walk 
alone at night, and neither has reason to fear the other? The real question 
is: How do we get to a point where rape is rape, and all rape is real rape, 
regardless of race? The real question is: Can changing the law—black 
letter or white letter—get us there; and if not, what can? 
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CONCLUSION 
The goal of this Article has not been to write a blueprint for a new and 
better law of rape. But hopefully this Article has shed light on where we 
have been, how we have gotten to where we are, and how the law of rape 
owes much to, and remains stained by, the sexualization of race and the 
racialization of rape. Hopefully, too, this Article has argued for a change 
in course, and has set a goal: to a way of thinking about and applying the 
law of rape that is free from gendered stereotypes and free from racial 
stereotypes. The goal has been set. The task now is in setting the course. 
But here is the important thing: in setting the course, what is needed is 
thoughtful, critical, and honest dialogue representing multiple points of 
address and analysis. Rape law, as it existed at common law, was written, 
crafted, and shaped entirely by privileged men. Meanwhile, the rape laws, 
as they exist today, owe much of their provenance to feminist scholars 
working in the 1970s and 1980s. And while much of the blatant sexism in 
original rape laws has been eradicated, still, there is work to be done. Still, 
there is inequality. In the end, then, this Article is a call, an invitation, and 
a challenge. If we want to fashion a law of rape that is fair to everyone, 
then we need everyone at the table in fashioning that law. That includes 
black men. That includes those who know what it means to be an 
unintentional rapist. 
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